THE W VISA: A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL FOR FEMALE AND CHILD REFUGEES
TRAPPED IN A POST-9/11 WORLD
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[Abstract: This article addresses an urgent humanitarian crisis affecting unaccompanied or
abused refugee children and widowed, divorced, abandoned or abused female heads of refugee
households. Such women and children suffer the consequences of the post-9/11 U.S. refugee
resettlement backlog more severely than the general refugee population. They are far more at
risk of life-threatening harm such as trafficking, sexual exploitation and rape. Moreover, they
are far less likely to present a threat to U.S. national security than many people who are able to
secure visas to the United States quickly and with fewer background checks. Despite their
vulnerability and lack of security threat, however, they continue to languish in extremely
dangerous refugee camps. This article proposes a solution that would allow such women and
children to avoid the resettlement delays and enter the United States through an expedited visa
system. The expedited visa system would reduce the refugee backlog and do so in a way that
ensures that the most vulnerable refugees receive protection at the earliest possible opportunity.]
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I.

Introduction

Sahra Dirie is a refugee from Somalia.2 She fled her country with her husband and their
children when civil war broke out in 1991.3 They sought refuge in neighboring Kenya, where
they were placed in the Garisa refugee camp. There they lived in a tent and relied on handouts
from international humanitarian organizations to survive. The camp was dirty, disease ridden
and violent. The Kenyan police who patrolled the camp beat and raped its inhabitants with
impunity.
Sahra came to know of this all too well when a Kenyan police officer raped her. In
Somali culture, the victim of rape brings shame upon a woman and renders her a disgrace to her
family.4 This being the case, Sahra did not tell anyone except her sister in the United States what
happened to her. She believes her husband suspected it, however, because he abandoned her and
the family shortly after the rape. At the time he left, Sahra was pregnant, she believes from the
rape.
Sahra was left with her six other children and only her elderly mother to help her care and
provide for them. A few months later, in 2002, Sahra’s mother received word that she had been
2

Interview with Shukri Dirie, sister of Sahra Dirie, in Washington D.C. (July 8, 2003). See generally Women’s
Commission for Refugee Women and Children, http://www.womenscommission.org/index.html (providing
resources and background information regarding Sahra Dirie and refugees in general). See generally the
International Rescue Committee, http://www.theirc.org/ (providing resources and background information on
refugees).
3
Civil war erupted in Somalia at the beginning of January 1991. Deposed Somali dictator Siad Barre fled into exile
as militias from rival clans flooded into the capital city of Mogadishu. The clan militias embarked on a campaign of
brutality, rape, killing and looting. Members of unprotected minority clans, such as Sahra’s Darod clan, were their
principal targets. Thousands of Somalis fled Mogadishu to outlying areas and to neighboring Kenya and Ethiopia.
The exodus increased in proportion when the militias eventually spread to the more remote areas of the country.
Internally displaced Somalis fled the country and became refugees, straining the already burdened camps in Kenya
and Ethiopia. Thirteen years later, despite a provisional government’s attempts to restore order in Mogadishu,
warlords continue to control most of the city as well as the rest of Somalia. See Amy E. Eckert, Comment, United
Nations Peacekeeping in Collapsed States, 5 J. INT’L L. & PRAC. 273, 282-84 (1996). See also The World
Factbook, Somalia, Central Intelligence Agency, at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/so.html#Govt
(last modified May 11, 2004).
4
See Karl Vick, For Somali Refugees, No Safe Haven; Fear of Rape Grips Women in Camps, WASH. POST FOREIGN
SERVICE, June 3, 1999, at A19 (discussing conditions in refugee camps and cultural stigma rape carries in Somali
culture).
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approved for resettlement in the United States.5 After Sahra gave birth, she went to the
resettlement interview with her mother, believing that she would be accompanying her mother to
the United States. The representative informed them that Sahra, due to the fact that she was over
twenty-one years of age, did not qualify to join her mother.6 Moreover, Sahra had never
registered as a refugee with the camp authorities and thus had not been identified as an applicant
for resettlement in her own right.7
Sahra’s mother received final approval on her application for refugee resettlement. She
was ill and had little choice but to leave Kenya for the United States. Sahra was left alone with
her children in the refugee camp.
After her mother’s departure, Sahra lost hope in the refugee system. She took her
children to live in a shantytown on the outskirts of the camp in a misguided effort to escape
violence and despair. Humanitarian groups worked to secure a new resettlement interview for
Sahra based on a different category of resettlement reserved for at-risk women and children. By
the time the humanitarian groups managed to secure a new resettlement interview in early 2004,
however, camp officials could not locate Sahra and her children. Their fate is unknown.8

5

See U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, Protecting Refugees: Resettlement, available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgibin/texis/vtx/home?page=PROTECT&id=3b8366bc4&ID=3b8366bc4&PUBLISHER=TWO (last visited Feb. 2,
2005) [hereinafter UNHCR, Resettlement] (explaining definition and reasoning for resettlement). The U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) defines resettlement is the permanent relocation of refugees to a safe third
country. It is an option for those refugees who cannot return to their home country due to past persecution or a fear
of future persecution, and for whom integration in the country of refuge is not feasible.
6
See 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(2) (2002) (identifying which relatives may accompany or follow to join persons granted
refugee status in United States). The statute permits a “child,” defined at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1) (2000) as “an
unmarried person under twenty-one years of age” to accompany or follow to join a parent, but does not permit adult
daughters and sons to do so. Id. See also Immigration and Nationality Act (“I.N.A.”), § 101(b)(1) (2000) (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1) (2000)).
7
Telephone interview with representative of UNHCR, in (Nov. 19, 2004) (during which representative requested
anonymity). See generally Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children,
http://www.womenscommission.org/index.html (providing resources and background information). See generally
the International Rescue Committee, http://www.theirc.org/ (providing resources and background information).
8
E-mail from Christopher Nugent, Christopher Nugent, Senior Counsel at Holland and Knight, to author (July 30,
2004, 15:09:02 EST) (on file with author) (referencing March 26, 2004 e-mail from UNHCR representative who
wishes to remain anonymous). The UNHCR representative wrote that Shukri Dirie had left her a voice mail
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The conditions in Sahra’s refugee camp are similar to those found in refugee camps all
over the world and are partly to blame for her ordeal. Violence, poverty and disease are common
in refugee camps and affect the entire refugee population.9 Women and children, particularly
unaccompanied children10 and women who are single heads of households, are even more
susceptible to camp conditions and to a broader range of violent acts and persecution because of
their age and/or sex.11 Due to cultural traditions and camp logistics, women are also less likely
to have a voice in camp management or, in the case of children as well as women, even to be
registered as refugees.12 This lack of visibility increases the risk that women and children
refugees, even more so than the rest of the refugee population, will suffer severe abuse and
deprived of refugee benefits.

message stating that Sahra Dirie may have returned to Somalia, despairing of ever joining her sister and mother in
the United States. Id.
9
For a discussion of the conditions in refugee camps for women and children, see infra notes 72-89 and
accompanying text. See generally Jean Ward, If Not Now, When? Addressing Gender-based Violence in Refugee,
Internally Displaced, and Post-conflict Settings: A Global Overview, The Reproductive Health Response in Conflict
Consortium, at http://www.womenscommission.org/pdf/ifnotnow.pdf (Apr. 2002) [hereinafter Ward].
10
See UNHCR, Protecting Children: Number of Unaccompanied Children Seeking Asylum Steady Despite Wars
and Forced Conscription, UNHCR NEWS STORIES, Nov. 13, 2001, (explaining what constitutes unaccompanied
child and providing statistics on how many are in refugee camps). The term “unaccompanied children” refers to
children without custodial parents or official guardians.
11
See UNHCR, RESETTLEMENT HANDBOOK, § 4.5.2 at 17 (Nov. 2004), available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgibin/texis/vtx/home?page=PROTECT&id=3d4545984&ID=3d4545984&PUBLISHER=TWO [hereinafter UNHCR,
RESETTLEMENT HANDBOOK].
For purposes of resettlement, UNHCR considers as women-at-risk those women or girls who have
protection problems particular to their gender, whether they are single heads of families,
unaccompanied girls, or together with their male (or female) family members. Refugee women or
girls may be at risk of or have suffered from a wide range of protection problems, including
expulsion, refoulement and other security threats, sexual violence, physical abuse, intimidation,
torture, particular economic hardship or marginalization, lack of integration prospects, community
hostility, and different forms of exploitation. Such problems and threats are often compounded by
the effects of past=persecution sustained either in their country of origin or during flight. The
trauma of having been uprooted, deprived of normal family and community support systems and
cultural ties, the abrupt change in roles and status, the fact or threat of violence, or the absence of
male family members (while not an absolute condition), may render some refugee women or girls
particularly vulnerable. These are contributing factors in determining whether resettlement is the
appropriate solution.
Id.
12
For a discussion of the lack of the input from women and children in refugee camp management, see infra no
tes
85-89 and accompanying text.
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The nature of the U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program also played a significant role in the
outcome of Sahra’s case. U.S. national security concerns and shifting policy priorities combine
with corrupt practices on the part of resettlement applicants and aid workers to create a
labyrinthine resettlement process that often seems illogical and inefficient.13 As a result,
individuals like Sahra, who have not committed fraud, do not present national security risks, and
are a high priority for humanitarian assistance, nevertheless slip through the gaping cracks that
plague the system.
The U.S. government’s decision to halt refugee resettlement for over two months in the
wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks has intensified the debate over refugees and
scrutiny of U.S. resettlement practices.14 The suspension caused a backlog in which over
100,000 refugees cleared for resettlement could not take the final steps in their journey and travel
to the United States.15 Although some of those refugees have reportedly resolved their cases and
entered the United States,16 the debate between national security and refugee needs rages on, and
the United States continues to fail to meet it annual resettlement ceiling.
This Article proposes a vehicle, in the form of a new non-immigrant visa, for
expeditiously resettling those refugees who are most at risk of harm and least threatening to U.S.
13

For a discussion of the U.S. policy and lengthy resettlement process, see infra notes 93-106 and accompanying
text.
14
For a discussion of current U.S. policy on the admission of refugees post-9/11, see infra notes 93-112 and
accompanying text.
15
See George Gedda, Admission of Refugees into U.S. Down, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 3, 2003, available at
http://www.unrefugees.org/archives.cfm?ID=576&cat=Archives [hereinafter Gedda, Admission of Refugees] (noting
in fiscal year 2002, United States fell short of its 70,000-person refugee admission ceiling by 42,971). Fiscal year
2004 saw a shortfall of 17,125. See U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, BUREAU OF POPULATION, REFUGEES AND MIGRATION,
Summary of Refugee Admissions Fiscal Year 2003 (Sept. 30, 2003), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38023.pdf [hereinafter U.S., Refugee Admissions 2003]. In total,
101,674 refugee allocations have gone unfilled since fiscal year 2002. See U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, PRESS BRIEFING,
Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2004, (Oct. 4, 2004), available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/36717.htm. [hereinafter U.S., Refugee Admissions FY 2004].
16
See David A. Martin, The United States Refugee Admissions Program: Reforms for a New Era of Refugee
Resettlement, at 133 (Sept. 29, 2004), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/36495.pdf
[hereinafter Martin, Reforms] (stating that most of the cases affected by the immediate aftermath of the September
11, 2001 terrorist attacks “have been located and dealt with”).
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national security: abandoned or abused female and child refugees whose sex and/or age make
them particularly vulnerable to harm. This Article will refer to the visa as a “W visa.”17 The W
visa would be available to eligible refugees who have not yet resettled in the United States due to
post-9/11 security measures as well as to eligible refugees who, like Sahra Dirie, are denied
resettlement on certain non-security related grounds.
The Article focuses on women and children rather than other at-risk refugee populations,
such as the sick or elderly, because of the unique situation of women and children.18 While all
refugees may encounter human rights abuses and hardships such as deprivation of food or
shelter, women and children are more at risk for all types of human rights violations because of
their subordinate status and subjugation within most refugee populations.19 Their subordinate
status is evident in the actual or perceived lack of redress available for crimes committed against
them, especially sex crimes;20 prevalence of physical abuse towards wives and children;21

17

See 8 U.S.C § 1101(a)(15)(v) (2000); I.N.A. §101(a)(15)(v) (2000). The last statutory visa designation is the “V”
visa.
18
See Jonathan Todres, Women’s Rights and Children’s Rights: A Partnership with Benefits for Both, 10 CARDOZO
WOMEN’S L.J. 603, 605 (noting that “political obstacles, such as not having the right to vote, and developmental
issues, such as the more limited verbal skills of younger children, make children more susceptible to exploitation”).
Professor Todres also identifies a number of practices to which women are vulnerable due to their gender, such as
“domestic violence, incest, rape, trafficking and forced prostitution, child marriages, dowry-related violence, and
female genital mutilation.” Id. at 606.
19
See id. (stating that “[p]rejudicial practices against women and girls, particularly in developing countries, are often
rooted in traditional cultural views of male-dominance”).
20
See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Kohn, Rape as a Weapon of War: Women’s Human Rights During the Dissolution of
Yugoslavia, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 199, 204-07 (1994) (noting lack of attention paid to wartime rape by
international community). See also, Ward, supra note 9, at 55. The laws of Thailand, where thousands of Burmese
refugees reside, permits perpetrators of statutory rape to marry their victims in order to escape punishment, and
resolves cases of rape of a married woman by offering financial compensation to the woman’s husband. Id.
21
See Ward, supra note 9, at 9. In a 1998 survey conducted by the International Rescue Committee, seventy-nine
percent of Afghan women refugees reported having been beaten by their husbands. Id. Pathfinder International and
the Azerbaijan Sociological Association conducted a study of female Azerbaijani refugees and internally displaced
persons that revealed that twenty-three percent of women interviewed had been beaten by their husbands. Twentysix percent declined to answer the question. Id. at 73. Thailand does not criminalize domestic violence. In fact,
Thai law actually discourages victims of domestic violence as well as other gender-based violence from seeking
redress against their abusers. Id. at 55.
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harmful cultural practices such as female genital mutilation;22 lack of visibility/ leadership
positions;23 and growth in the trafficking of women and children worldwide.24 Traditions of
subjugation usually predate the refugee flow but conflict and the resulting displacement often
exacerbate the situation.25 Although United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(“UNHCR”) has taken significant measures to improve the safety of women and children in
refugee camps,26 such measures must compete against cultural norms in which subordination is

22

See World Health Organization, Fact Sheet No. 241 (June 2000), available at
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs241/en/ (explaining female genital mutilation is removal of all or part
of female genitalia for non-therapeutic reasons). Approximately two million women in twenty-eight different
countries are at risk for FGM every year. Id. Estimates put the number of victims of FGM at between 100 million
and 140 million. Id. Among refugee populations, FGM is most common among women from Somalia, and to a
lesser degree, Sudan. See Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children, UNHCR Policy on Refugee
Women and Guidelines on Their Protection: An Assessment of Ten Years of Implementation, at 25 (May 2002),
available at http://www.womenscommission.org/pdf/unhcr.pdf [hereinafter Women’s Commission, UNHCR
Policy]. For a discussion of other harmful cultural practices that exist in many cultures and tend to increase in postconflict situations, such as early marriage and dowry, female infanticide, and enforced sterilization, see generally
Ward, supra note 9.
23
See UNHCR, GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF REFUGEE WOMEN, ¶¶ 82-85 (July 1991), available at
http://www.unhcr.ch/cgibin/texis/vtx/home/+BwwBmexrMN_wwwwnwwwwwwwmFqA72ZR0gRfZNhFqo7E2RN02ItFqrpGdBnqBzFqm
RbZAFqo7E2RN02IDzmxwwwwwww5Fqw1FqmRbZ/opendoc.pdf [hereinafter UNHCR, GUIDELINES ON THE
PROTECTION OF REFUGEE WOMEN] (reporting that representatives of international organizations and host countries
met with male camp leaders on issues such as distribution of food and other items, even though it was the role of
female camp inhabitants to cook, feed and clothe their families). Refugee women have traditionally lacked
leadership positions in refugee camps, even in management areas in which their participation is vital. See also,
UNHCR, SEXUAL AND GENDER BASED VIOLENCE AGAINST REFUGEES, RETURNEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED
PERSONS, at 31 (May 2003), available at http://www.rhrc.org/pdf/gl_sgbv03_00.pdf [hereinafter UNHCR, SEXUAL
AND GENDER BASED VIOLENCE] (noting that “[m]ost leadership structures in refugee situations are dominated by
men.”). UNHCR has attempted to increase the status and visibility of women in refugee camps by encouraging their
assumption of leadership positions and including them in dialogues regarding camp management. See generally
UNHCR, GOOD PRACTICES ON GENDER EQUALITY MAINSTREAMING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO EMPOWERMENT, at 3
(June 2001), available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900SID/LGEL-5JGE4A/$FILE/hcr-genderjun01.pdf?OpenElement.
24
See Conclusion on Protection Safeguards in Interception Measures No. 97 (LIV – 2003), 16 INT’L. J. REFUGEE L.
153, 153 (2004) (identifying trafficking as a growing concern in refugee protection). For further discussion of the
trafficking of female and child refugees, see infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
25
Ward, supra note 9, at 8. See generally Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol, Sex, Culture and Rights: A Reconceptualization of Violence for the Twenty-First Century, 60 ALB. L. REV. 607 (1997) (providing general
discussion of social and legal entrenchment of subjugation of women worldwide).
26
See UNHCR, GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF REFUGEE WOMEN, supra note 23, ¶¶ 82-85 (noting that in
1991, UNHCR promulgated Guidelines for the Protection of Refugee Women and Children). The Guidelines
suggested a number of measures to improve the situation of female and child refugees, such as ensuring that women
participate in consultations regarding camp design and layout; distributing food directly to women; recruiting and
training refugee women as health care workers. Id. ¶¶ 8, 86, 102. Ten years later, the Women’s Commission for
Refugee Women and Children examined the effects and success of the Guidelines. See Women’s Commission,
UNHCR Policy, supra note 22,at 2. The Women’s Commission found that enrollment of refugee girls in school

8

entrenched, and against host countries who fail to implement, abide by or reinforce the
measures.27
The proposed non-immigrant visa would provide expedited relief limited in scope and in
immediate benefits conferred. It does not create a more expansive system because, in the post9/11 world, such a system would likely be prone to legislative, regulatory and administrative
delays.28 Moreover, it is not an attempt to overhaul the U.S. refugee resettlement program, but
rather a suggestion for a security-conscious but expeditious parallel vehicle for resettlement.
Part II of this Article describes the refugee system, including conditions in refugee camps,
the particular vulnerability of orphaned or abandoned children and women who face genderbased harm, and the post-9/11 U.S. refugee resettlement crisis. Part III puts forth a legislative
proposal for a new visa category for certain female and child refugees to help eliminate the
resettlement backlog and to identify particularly vulnerable refugees whom refugee officials may
fail to identify for resettlement. Part III also examines and critiques a proposed bill for certain
female and child refugees that the Senate Judiciary Committee is currently considering and
argues that the proposal put forth in this Article is more feasible. The Article concludes that a

increased; women refugees were more involved in camp management decisions; and more female staff were
working in health and education programs. Id. However, the Women’s Commission also found that the
implementation of the Guidelines had been “uneven and incomplete, occurring on an ad hoc basis in certain sites
rather than in a globally consistent and systematic way.” Id. at 2. See generally UNHCR, Sexual Violence Against
Refugees: Guidelines on Prevention and Response (1995), available at
http://www.forcedmigration.org/sphere/pdf/shelter/unhcr/sexual-violence.pdf.
27
See U.S. GOV’T ACCT. OFF., Humanitarian Assistance: Protecting Refugee Women and Girls Remains a
Significant Challenge, GAO-03-663, at 6-7 (May 2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03663.pdf
[hereinafter GAO, Humanitarian Assistance] (noting some governments prohibit international organizations from
accessing their refugee populations, thus stymieing protection activities).
28
See Child Status Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 107-108, 116 Stat. 927 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2002)) (allowing children of recipients of certain immigration benefits to continue to qualify as
derivative beneficiaries upon turning twenty-one). See also Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-193, 117 Stat. 2875 (altering some provisions of Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000). Conversely,
legislation severely limiting immigration benefits and expanding expedited removal has garnered widespread
support in Congress. See, e.g., REAL ID Act of 2005, H.R. 418, 109th Cong. §§ 101, 103-04, 201-02 (2005).
Sponsored by Rep. James Sensenbrenner, the REAL ID Act seeks to raise the standard for asylum eligibility, require
that driver’s licenses contain information regarding the holders’ immigration status in order for federal agencies to
accept them as identification; and expand the definition of “terrorist” and “terrorist activity.”
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new immigrant visa category for unprotected women and children is consistent with the United
States’ tradition of creating visas to address humanitarian concerns, consistent with the United
States’ national security interests, and the most viable option for assisting refugees for whom the
post-9/11 resettlement crisis has far worse consequences than mere deferment of an American
dream.
II.

The Refugee System

A. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
Persons at risk of persecution arising from violent civil conflict, severe repression and
political crises29 often cross the border into a neighboring country or are evacuated to
neighboring countries to seek temporary shelter.30 Once in this second country, or country of
first asylum, many live in an area designated for refugees,31 usually a camp like the one in which
Sahra lived. They remain there until they can return home or, if return does not seem likely,
secure permanent resettlement32 in a safe third country, or “receiving country.”33

29

CHRISTINA BOSWELL, ADDRESSING THE CAUSES OF MIGRATORY AND REFUGEE MOVEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION, at 6 (UNHCR, New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 73, Dec. 2002)
(“Repression is also likely to involve cracking down on dissidents and general infringements of civil liberties.
Where the state is unable to consolidate a repressive regime in this way, a third possibility is descent into
[generalized] violence or civil conduct.”).
30
See UNHCR, REFUGEES BY NUMBERS 2004, UNHCR/PI/NUMBERS/ENG 1, at 9 (Sept. 2004) [hereinafter
UNHCR, REFUGEES BY NUMBERS] (noting that Afghan refugees sought first asylum in neighboring Pakistan and
Iran; Sudanese refugees fled to the border nations Uganda, Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Democratic Republic of the
Congo, and Central African Republic; and Burundian refugees sought refuge first in neighboring Tanzania,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zambia, and Rwanda).
31
See the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, UNHCR, U.N. Doc.
HCR/MMSP/2001/09 (2002) [hereinafter the 1951 UN Convention]. These conventions established the definition
of a refugee.
[A refugee is] owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of
his [or her] nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself [or
herself] of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the
country of his [or her] former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to
such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
Id. art. 1, at 16.
32
See UNHCR, Resettlement, supra note 5 (explaining resettlement is one of three long-term solutions to a refugee
crisis, other two are voluntary repatriation and local integration). “Through resettlement, refugees gain legal
protection – residency and often eventually citizenship – from governments who agree, on a case-by-case basis, to

10

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is the principal
international agency that provides aid to refugees.

34

UNHCR plays a major role in all areas of

refugee life, from establishing and running refugee camps in countries that host refugee
populations, to determining the most feasible solution for various refugee populations, to
assisting with voluntary repatriation and working with receiving countries if repatriation is not an
option. UNHCR performs its functions with the assistance of a vast web of international
humanitarian agencies;35 as well as officials from host countries,36 and receiving countries,37 and
sending countries.

open up their communities to new members.” Id. Resettlement is often the only viable option for refugees who face
persecution in their native countries and whose security remains at risk in their countries of first asylum, whose
families have been divided by borders or even entire continents, who have suffered torture, or who have medical
problems for which treatment is unavailable in their countries of first asylum. See UNHCR, RESETTLEMENT
HANDBOOK, supra note 11, § 1.2-1.3.
33
See UNHCR, EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER’S PROGRAMME, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR
RESETTLEMENT POLICY AND PRACTICE, Standing Comm. 21st Meeting EC/51/SC/INF.2, at 3 (Jun. 14, 2001)
[hereinafter UNHCR, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR RESETTLEMENT] (listing ten traditional receiving countries: Australia,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, and United States, accept a
certain number of refugees for resettlement each year based on quota system). Eight emerging resettlement
countries, Argentina, Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Chile, Iceland, Ireland and Spain have agreed to establish formal
resettlement programs as well as procedures for adjudicating resettlement requests. Id. The United Kingdom agreed
in 2003 to do the same. See Kathleen Newland, Refugee Resettlement in Transition (Sept. 1, 2002), available at
http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=52. Belgium, France, and Germany accept refugees
for resettlement on an ad hoc basis rather than maintaining an annual quota of refugees. Id.
34
See UNHCR, HELPING REFUGEES: AN INTRODUCTION TO UNHCR, at 5 (2001), available at
http://www.unhcr.ch/cgibin/texis/vtx/basics/+hwwBmeii6xeqxwwwwnwwwwwwwxFqAvxxvWW9WWwmFqtFEIfgIhFqoUfIfRZ2ItFqtxw
5oq5zFqtFEIfgIAFqoUfIfRZ2IDzmxwwwwwww1FqtFEIfgI/opendoc.pdf (detailing size and achievements of
UNHCR).
35
See generally UNHCR, NGO PARTNERSHIPS IN REFUGEE PROTECTION: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (2004),
available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgibin/texis/vtx/home/+UwwBme3cibexxwwwwnwwwwwwwhFqo7E2RN02ItFqopwGBDnG5AFqo7E2RN02IcFqN
NHZa7wGBDnG5rop5aoDa2nh1tnna7GdBnqBodDaDzmxwwwwwww1FqnN0bI/opendoc.pdf. (discussing
UNHCR partners with international, national, faith-based, and intergovernmental humanitarian organizations to
provide various forms of aid to refugees). Some groups receive financial support from UNHCR to perform specific
services for refugees. Id. Others do not receive UNHCR financial support but collaborate closely with UNHCR to
provide emergency relief and resettlement assistance. Id. at 7. Its partners include the International Federation of
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), World Health Organization (WHO), World Food Program (WFP),
International Organization of Migration (IOM) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). See UNHCR,
Basic Information about UNHCR: What Is UNHCR?, available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgibin/texis/vtx/basics/+7wwBmeWLQw_wwwwnwwwwwwwhFqoUfIfRZ2ItFqtxw5oq5zFqtFEIfgIAFqoUfIfRZ2IDz
mxwwwwwww1FqtFEIfgI/opendoc.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2005) [hereinafter UNHCR, What is UNHCR?].
36
See UNHCR, REFUGEES BY NUMBERS, supra note 30, at 2 (noting term “host country” refers to countries of first
asylum as well as resettlement countries). According to UN estimates, Iran, Pakistan, Germany and Tanzania are
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The High Commissioner’s advisory committee, the Executive Committee of the High
Commissioner’s Programme,38 considers resettlement “a key instrument for ensuring the
protection of refugees and for seeking durable solutions to their plight.”39 Of the 10,389,700
refugees that UNHCR estimated to be present in the world in 2003,40 only about 100,000
received resettlement approval from receiving countries.41 This low number evidences the
magnitude of the plight of refugees as well as the complexity of the resettlement process.
In order to be identified for resettlement, a refugee must first register with UNHCR or
other NGO,42 then have an individual interview with a UNHCRor NGO representative,43 then
finally have an interview with a receiving country’s immigration official. Such interviews allow
the four major refugee hosting countries, estimated to host 1.3 million, 1.2 million, 980,000 and 690,000 refugees
respectively. Id. The UN also considers the United States, Serbia and Montenegro, Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Sudan, China and Armenia major refugee hosting countries. Id.
37
See UNHCR, What is UNHCR?, supra note 35 (explaining receiving countries such as Canada, United Kingdom
and United States also provide significant monetary aid to UNHCR). “More unorthodox, and at times controversial
partners, have included U.N. peacekeepers in the former Yugoslavia, Kosovo and Timor, various militaries which
provided logistical support in Rwanda and Kosovo and financial institutions such as the World Bank.” Id.
38
See UNHCR, Background on the Executive Committee, available at www.unhcr.ch/cgibin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.html?id=3b4f09faa&tbl=EXCOM&P (last visited July 2, 2004) (noting Executive
Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, or EXCOM, created in 1959, consists of sixty-four member
nations, all of whom are members of the U.N. and “have a demonstrated interest in and devotion to the solution of
the refugee problem.”).
39
UNHCR, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR RESETTLEMENT, supra note 33, at 1 (detailing importance of resettlement in
refugee process).
40
See UNHCR, REFUGEES BY NUMBERS, supra note 30
, at 6 (n oting figure does not include asylum seekers,
refugees who voluntarily return to their original countries, internally displaced persons, or stateless individuals).
41
See id. at 8 (demonstrating how few refugees are accepted at receiving countries).
42
See UNHCR, RESETTLEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 11, § 1, at 6 (“In using resettlement more effectively as a
durable solution, States and UNHCR are further asked to examine how to carry out earlier analysis of date deriving
from refugee registration to anticipate the needs for resettlement of individuals or specific groups and to process
more rapidly resettlement applications particularly in emergency situations.”). The registration process involves a
number of steps: (1) “simple enumeration or estimation” (counting of refugees); (2) “fixing the arriving populations
with the standard UNHCR token or an equivalent” (providing refugees with wristbands or other temporary form of
identification); (3) “creat[ing] [an] address system” (dividing the refugee camp into sections, blocks and, if possible,
numbers); (4) “control sheet registration in combination with family cards” (providing formal registration cards to
refugee families); (5) “distribution of assistance and services”; and (6) “identification of persons with special
needs.” Id. at 54-55.
43
See id. § 6 at 8 (noting through specific sub-agreement, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) may run
prescreening programs to assess protection and other needs in large refugee populations).
The identification of an individual refugee in need of resettlement consideration is typically the
result of a referral received from within UNHCR, from an organization external to UNHCR
working with refugees, or from refugees themselves. The most effective and responsive
resettlement procedures will include consideration of referrals from all three sources.
Id. § 6 at 6.

12

UNHCR, humanitarian agencies and NGO
s to elicit information from potential resettlement
applicants and determine whether they meet the definition of a refugee.44 Some receiving
countries also employ interviews to ascertain whether resettlement applicants meet the definition
of a refugee, but also to determine whether resettlement applicants meet country-specific
requirements for proof of identity, family relationship, credibility and resettlement eligibility. 45
The needs of refugees and the needs of receiving countries are often at odds and thus
create a cyclical dilemma. On the one hand, refugees’ desperate longing to find a permanent safe
living situation often leads to the commission of fraud in applying for refugee benefits,46 which
in turn leads to receiving countries placing more restrictions on resettlement.47 On the other
hand, a lack of willingness on the part of many countries to accept refugees is obviously a
contributing factor to the severe shortage of resettlement opportunities. As the number of

44

See id. § 6 at 16 (stating that interviews are always necessary in resettlement selection process and offering
detailed guidance in how UNHCR staff should conduct interviews). See generally, id. § 4 (specifying information
which UNCHR and NGOs should elicit from resettlement applicants in order to determine whether applicants meet
definition of refugees and qualify for resettlement, including, inter alia: harm that applicants suffered in their home
country, reasons why applicants fear returning to their home country, whether internal relocation in home country or
permanent status in country of first asylum is possible, special medical needs, and whereabouts of family members).
45
See UNHCR, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR RESETTLEMENT, supra note 33, at 3 (noting methods for accepting refugees
vary by country). Resettlement criteria usually goes well beyond the refugee definition. For example, Australia’s
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs “decision-makers” evaluate whether applicants for
resettlement in Australia have other suitable durable solutions available to them, and whether “permanent settlement
in Australia is the appropriate course for the individual and would not be contrary to the interests of Australia.” See
UNHCR, RESETTLEMENT HANDBOOK AND COUNTRY CHAPTERS, ch. Australia, at 3 (June 2004), available at
http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PROTECTION&page=PROTECT&id=3c5e542d4.
Canadian visa officers must decide whether applicants for resettlement in Canada (except for particularly vulnerable
applicants) have the potential to become self-sufficient in Canada within three to five years. In making this
determination, visa officers take into account factors such as “education, presence of a support network (family or
sponsor) in Canada, work experience and qualifications, ability to learn to speak English or French and other
personal suitability factors such as resourcefulness.” See UNHCR, RESETTLEMENT HANDBOOK AND COUNTRY
CHAPTERS, ch. Canada., at 2 (June 2004), available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgibin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PROTECTION&page=PROTECT&id=3c5e55594.
46
See Martin, Reforms, supra note 16, at 10 (“In any selective system, fraud is an inescapable problem.”). This is
especially true in the refugee arena, where “[g]oing to America is the holy grail of refugee life. People will cajole,
bribe, threaten and kill for the opportunity.” Sasha Chanoff, After Three Years: Somali Bantus Prepare to Come to
America, REFUGEE REP., Nov. 2002, at 1, reprinted in Martin, Reports, supra note 16, at 10.
47
See UNHCR, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR RESETTLEMENT, supra note 33, at 3 (demonstrating growing government
restrictions on refugee admissions in preventing fraud). See generally id. at pt. II, § D, and pt. III, § X.
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refugees worldwide remains fairly constant from year to year,48 the cycle of fraud (on the part of
resettlement applicants) and unwillingness to participate in resettlement programs (on the part of
receiving countries) continues. As a result, a phenomenon called “refugee warehousing” has
emerged, in which millions of refugees live in refugee camps or surrounding areasfor ten years
or more, usually in a state of dependency and without adequate access to basic rights such as
employment, freedom of movement and education.49
Amina M. and her family have experienced refugee warehousing firsthand. Amina was
born in Somalia in 1978. She lived with her family in the capital, Mogadishu. When she was
twelve years old, war broke out in Mogadishu. Like Sahra Dirie, Amina and her family
belonged to a small tribe that the larger tribes targeted for rape and murder. Amina’s father
disappeared amid the chaos. Realizing that the family needed to flee the city, Amina’s mother
went out to look for him. When she did not return, Amina and her aunt went to look for her.
They found her dead in the street from a gunshot wound.
Amina fled Mogadishu and soon Somalia with her sister, brothers, aunt and cousins. The
two oldest brothers became separated from the rest of the family and went to a camp in Ethiopia.
Amina went with her younger sister and brother and her extended family to a Kenyan refugee
camp. They lived there for two years, then in a house nearby for seven years. During those nine
years, neither Amina nor her brothers and sisters never received an offer of resettlement. By the
time they left Kenya to seek asylum in the United States, Amina was twenty, and her younger

48

See UNHCR, REFUGEES BY NUMBERS, supra note 30
, at 18 (noting between 1997 and 2002, worldwide refugee
population remained between 10,389,600 and 12,062,500).
49
See Merrill Smith, Warehousing Refugees: A Denial of Rights, a Waste of Humanity, U.S. COMMITTEE FOR
REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE SURV., at 38 (2004), available at http://www.refugees.org/data/wrs/04/pdf/38-56.pdf
(“Warehousing is the practice of keeping refugees in protracted situations of restricted mobility, enforced idleness,
and dependency—their lives on idefinite hold—in violation of their basic rights under the 1951 UN Refugee
Convention.”). There are approximately 7.35 million warehoused refugees. See U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES,
WORLD REFUGEE SURV., at 1 (2004), available at http://www.refugees.org/article.aspx?id=1156 [hereinafter
WORLD REFUGEE SURV.]. See also, the 1951 UN Convention, supra note 31.
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sister and brother, ages fourteen and eleven respectively, had no recollection of life outside the
refugee camp area.50
Refugee warehousing highlights the increasing challenge of reconciling the receiving
countries’ need to protect the integrity of their resettlement processes with the refugees’ urgent
humanitarian needs. Measures that are “capable of responding both to [refugees’] special needs
and to the urgency of the required response”51 must also meet the security, social and economic
needs of the receiving country. The inherent tensions between the needs of refugees and those of
receiving countries is most apparent in the U.S. refugee resettlement system.
B. The U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program
The United States, as well as refugee-accepting countries around the world, recognizes
that refugees make important contributions to their adopted countries.52 As United Nations
Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated, “Refugees are the great survivors of our time.”53 They
have overcome war, persecution, hunger, disease and malnourishment. They carry their strength
and resourcefulness with them to their new homes. Although myths prevail that refugees drain

50

Interview with Amina M., a former client, (2001) (using pseudonym to protect client’s anonymity). Today,
Amina lives and works in the United States. She is putting her sister through college, and hopes to do the same for
her younger brother. She was reunited with her two older brothers in the last two years, and all have asylum in the
United States. They recently established contact with a man they believe to be their father. He has been living as a
refugee in Ethiopia since 1991.
51
UNHCR, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR RESETTLEMENT, supra note 33, at 2 (expressing why systems of resettlement are
so urgent).
The effectiveness of resettlement cannot simply be measured in numbers. Ensuring that there are
sufficient places available to meet the resettlement needs of refugees is only part of the challenge.
Systems and procedures must be responsive particularly to urgent needs. The integrity of the
process depends on how the cases are profiled and how rapidly they can be accepted.
Id.
52
See REFUGEE COUNCIL, CREDIT TO THE NATION: REFUGEE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UK, at 2 (June 2002),
available at http://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/downloads/rc_reports/credit.pdf. “Far from being a drain on
Britain’s finances, over the years refugees have had a positive economic impact, bringing new skills and ideas into
the country, and putting the resourcefulness and determination that drove them to seek asylum to use in British
workplaces. . . . Our refugee communities have also helped to shape the British cultural landscape, generating
artists, musicians, sports-people, chefs and innovative thinkers. . . .”
53
Kofi Annan, Notes Key Role of Asylum Countries- Urges Continued Aid for Resettlement Efforts, Message on
World Refugee Day (June 20, 2001), in U.N. Doc. SG/SM/9386 (articulating hardships and barriers refugees
overcome in plight to survive and find new homes).
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public resources and rely heavily on public assistance, states with refugee populations have
found that the reality is quite the opposite.54 The majority of resettled refugees have proven
themselves to be highly self-sufficient contributing members of society.55
In order to resettle in the United States, refugees must undergo a rigorous screening
process administrated by the Bureau of Populations, Refugees and Migration (“PRM”) of the
Department of State in conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security56 and the Office
of Refugee Resettlement (“ORR”) of the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS
” ).57
Applicants for admission to the United States must (1) meet the definition of a refugee,58 (2) be

54

See, e.g., Maryland Office for New Americans, Refugees Rebuilding Lives, available at
http://www.dhr.state.md.us/mona/who.htm#population (last visited Feb. 20, 2005) (stating that resettled refugees
contribute significantly to U.S. economy and culture by working hard, starting new businesses, purchasing homes,
consuming goods and services, and strengthening the social fabric of the country); Texas Dept. of Human Services,
New Americans in Texas: An Overview of Immigrants and Refugees (Nov. 2002) at 27, 51 (indicating that of the
estimated 27,123 refugees living in Texas, only 460 receive Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, 2,547 receive
food stamps, and 2,279 receive medical benefits, remaining at 0.15% of the total number of Texas recipients of
those services); Gov. Dirk Kempthorpe, Official Proclamation, June 20, 2004, available at
http://gov.idaho.gov/mediacenter/proc/proc04/procjune/proc_refugee.htm, (last visited Feb. 20, 2005) (stating that
Idaho “celebrates the contributions refugees make to our prosperity, our cultural enrichment and the character of all
of our people”); Iowa Dept. of Human Services Bureau of Refugee Services, Myths about Refugees, available at
http://www.dhs.state.ia.us/refugee/bureau/myths.asp (last visited Feb. 20, 2005) (emphasizing that refugees pay
taxes, are self-sufficient, and enrich their communities by sharing their “talents, skills, culture and customs”).
55
See UNHCR, Gallery of Prominent Refugees, available at http://www.unhcr.ch/promref/ (last visited Feb. 11,
2005) (providing information on dozens of prominent refugees in United States and around world, including Isabel
Allende, acclaimed author who fled Chile after military coup led by General Augusto Pinochet and now lives in San
Rafael, California; late philosopher Hannah Arendt, who fled to United States from Nazi-occupied Europe; Nobel
laureate Joseph Brodsky, who sought refuge in United States after his writings led to his persecution by Soviet
authorities; famous actress Marlene Dietrich, whose family was persecuted by Nazis for her refusal to support them;
Albert Einstein, a refugee from Nazi Germany; Walter Lam, a Ugandan refugee who fled to United States and later
founded Alliance for African Assistance, a nonprofit organization that assists refugees from all over world; and Rep.
Tom Lantos, who came to United States after World War II, only person in his family to have survived Holocaust).
56
Formerly the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).
57
See UNHCR, RESETTLEMENT HANDBOOK AND COUNTRY CHAPTERS, ch. U.S.A., at 2 (June 2004), available at
http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PROTECTION&page=PROTECT&id=3c5e5a764
[hereinafter UNHCR, COUNTRY CHAPTER: USA] (describing resettlement policies and procedures in United States).
58
See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2000) (providing definition of refugee).
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person
having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who
is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the
protection of, that country because of persecution or well-founded fear of persecution on account
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. . .
Id.
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among those refugees whom the President determines to be of special humanitarian concern,59
(3) be otherwise admissible under U.S. law,60 and (4) not be “firmly resettled”61 in another
country.62
In addition to relying on the above criteria to screen resettlement applicants, the United
States employs a priority system to determine in what order to accept applicants who meet the
basic eligibility criteria. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1157(e), the President submits an annual report
to the Congress detailing his recommendations for refugee admissions.63 The report is a core
part of an annual consultative process involving the presidential administration, Congress,
representatives of state and local governments, public interest groups, non-governmental
organizations, and others concerned with refugees.64 The end result of the annual consultative
process is the priority system for refugee resettlement.
Every year, the United States gives the highest priority to refugees whom UNHCR or the
U.S. embassy refers for resettlement due to “urgent humanitarian concerns.”65 These individuals

59

See 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(3) (2003) (“Admissions under this subsection shall be allocated among refugees of special
humanitarian concern to the United States in accordance with a determination by the President after appropriate
consultation.”).
60
See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2004), I.N.A. § 212 (2004) (classifying groups of aliens ineligible for visas or admission).
61
See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi) (2004), I.N.A. § 208 (b)(2)(A)(vi) (2004). See also 8 CFR 208.15 (2005)
(providing guidance on determining whether an applicant for asylum was firmly resettled in another country).
62
See UNHCR, COUNTRY CHAPTER: USA supra note 57, at 1 (noting five key criteria for refugee admission in
U.S.).
63
See 8 U.S.C. § 1157(e) states that the report must include:
(1) A description of the nature of the refugee situation. (2) A description of the number and
allocation of the refugees to be admitted and an analysis of conditions within the countries from
which they came. (3) A description of the proposed plans for their movement and resettlement
and the estimated cost of their movement and resettlement. (4) An analysis of the anticipated
social, economic, and demographic impact of their admission to the United States. (5) A
description of the extent to which other countries will admit and assist in the resettlement of such
refugees. (6) An analysis of the impact of the participation of the United States in the resettlement
of such refugees on the foreign policy interests of the United States. (7) Such additional
information as may be appropriate or requested by such members.
Id.
64
See UNCHR, COUNTRY CHAPTER: USA, supra note 57, at 2 (noting key actors President consults with before
creating U.S. refugee policy).
65
U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, DEPT. OF HOMELAND SECURITY, DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Proposed
Refugee Admissions for FY 2005 – Report to the Congress, at 7 (Sept. 2004), available at
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receive Priority One, or P-1, status.66 P-1 refugees generally include those who face compelling
security concerns in the country of first asylum, victims of torture or violence, at-risk women,
persons in urgent need of medical care, and persons who have suffered persecution because of
their political, religious or human rights activities.67 P-1 referrals must still establish past
persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution in the country from which they fled
prior to being accepted for resettlement.68
Upon receiving a referral from UNHCR or an NGO for P-1 processing, applicants for
resettlement in the United States must proceed through several more levels of adjudication.
First, the U. S. Department of State evaluates the cases based on the applicants’ situation in the
country of first asylum, the conditions from which they have fled, U.S. national interest, and
other humanitarian considerations.69 Second, applicants who appear to have suffered persecution
or to have a well-founded fear of future persecution70 and who otherwise fall within the United
States’ resettlement priorities must then meet with a U.S. immigration official to determine

http://www.state.gov/g/prm/asst/rl/rpts/36116.htm (discussing U.S. policy to take refugees with most urgent need
with higher priority).
66
See id. (describing how U.S. designates refugees for processing). In addition to P-1 processing, the United States
also designates “groups of special concern” for Priority Two, or P-2, processing and relatives of nationals of certain
countries for Priority Three, or P-3, processing. Id. The Bush Administration identified a number of groups for P-2
resettlement in fiscal year 2005, including human right activists in Cuba; Iranian members of religious minorities;
Jews, Evangelical Christians, and certain members of Orthodox churches in the former Soviet Union; Meskhetian
Turks in Russia; and Hmong in Thailand. Id. at 8. The Bush Administration designated fourteen countries (Burma,
Burundi, Colombia, Congo-Brazzaville, Congo-Kinshasa, Cuba, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Haiti, Iran, Liberia, Rwanda,
Somalia and Sudan) for P-3 family-based resettlement for fiscal year 2005. Id. at 9.
67
See UNHCR, COUNTRY CHAPTER: USA, supra note 57 at 2 (stating which persons are defined as Priority One in
U.S.).
68
See id. (discussing well-founded fear interview, process by which refugees discuss their fear about returning to
their native country).
69
See id. at 4 (noting procedures which U.S. uses to determine whether to accept refugees).
70
See Matter of Mogharabbi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 446 (B.I.A. 1987) (holding that an individual’s fear of
persecution is well-founded if he or she “(1) possesses a characteristic a persecutor seeks to overcome in others by
means of punishment of some sort; (2) the persecutor is already aware, or could . . . become aware, that the
[individual] possesses this belief or characteristic; (3) the persecutor has the capability of punishing the [individual];
and (4) the persecutor has the inclination to punish the [person]”) (quoting Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211,
226 (B.I.A. 1985)).
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whether they qualify for admission as a refugee.71 Once the immigration authorities approve an
applicant for resettlement, the applicant must undergo a medical examination and security checks
before travel arrangements to the United States can be made. The entire process, from UNHCR
referral to departing for the United States, can sometimes take years. For women and children,
even those who qualify for P-1 processing as at-risk refugees, the ever-increasing wait to leave
the refugee camp can have severe consequences for their health and well-being, even more so
than for other refugees.
1.

Women and Children in Refugee Camps

As discussed above, less than ten percent of the world’s refugee population receives
approval for resettlement each year.72 Those who do must wait years for their applications to be
processed, security checks to be completed and travel arrangements to be made. Those years are
spent living in refugee camps, many of which are overcrowded, isolated, disease-ridden and
violent.73

71

See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (2005) (“The testimony of the applicant, if credible, may be sufficient to sustain the
burden of proof without corroboration.”). The situation of refugees often makes it difficult for them to provide
documentary or third party testimonial corroboration of their claims, but U.S. regulations governing asylum, in
conformity with U.N. recommendations, specifies that an applicant’s credible testimony is sufficient to establish
eligibility. Id. See also UNHCR, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS
UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES,
HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 (Jan. 1992), ¶ 196 [hereinafter UNHCR, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA] (“In
most case a person fleeing from persecution will have arrived with the barest necessities and very frequently even
without documents. . . . [I]f the applicant’s account appears credible, he [or she] should, unless there are good
reasons to the contrary, be given the benefit of the doubt.”).
72
For a discussion of the statistics regarding the current refugee population, see supra notes 47-49 and
accompanying text.
73
See WORLD REFUGEE SURV., supra note 49, at 38-110 (describing lives and living conditions of refugees
throughout the world, including Lebanon, Africa, Pakistan and Europe). See also UNHCR, Life in a Refugee Camp
– The Inside Story, REFUGEES MAG, Sept. 1, 1996, issue 105(describing in detail conditions of Ethiopian refugee
camp to illustrate challenges that refugees and aid workers face on daily basis). See also UNHCR, Health: Familiar
Images, REFUGEES MAG., Sept. 1, 1996, issue 105. Factors inherent in a camp situation include “overcrowding,
which facilitates the transmission of infections diseases; poor nutrition and consequent lower immunity; lack of
clean water; poor sanitation; and inadequate shelter.” Id.
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Women and children comprise between seventy-five and eighty percent of the total
worldwide refugee population, or approximately eight million individuals.74

Despite their large

numbers, however, women and children tend to suffer the effects of refugee camp conditions
more severely than the adult male refugee population.75 Although women and children
constitute the vast majority of refugees worldwide, basic necessities and services for them are
scarce. Women and girls are vulnerable to gender-based violence and persecution such as rape,
forced marriage, female genital mutilation (“FGM”) and sexual slavery and exploitation while
living in refugee camps.76 Refugee children are at risk for death from preventable diseases; rape,
sexual slavery and sexual exploitation; and forcible conscription into militias.77
A number of factors combine to create circumstances that affect female sole heads of
households and unaccompanied minors with particular severity. Poverty, patriarchal cultural
attitudes, camp design and management, and lack of funding and budget shortfalls contribute to
the plight of all refugees, but are leading causes of the age- and gender-specific hazards

74

See UNHCR, Women – Seeking a Better Deal, REFUGEES MAG, Apr. 2, 2002, at 7 (noting that UNHCR cares for
21.8 million refugees, half of which are women).
75
See GAO, Humanitarian Assistance, supra note 27, at 25 (revealing GAO found “the conditions in refugee camps
create an ongoing environment in which women and girls are vulnerable to sexual exploitation and abuse of
power.”).
76
See UNHCR, PREVENTION AND RESPONSE TO SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE IN REFUGEE SITUATIONS, at
4 (Mar. 2001), available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgibin/texis/vtx/home/+owwBmeOYnR_wwwwGwwwwwwwhFqA72ZR0gRfZNtFqr72ZR0gRzFqmRbZAFqA72ZR0
gRfZNDzmxwwwwwww1FqmRbZ/opendoc.pdf [hereinafter UNHCR, PREVENTION AND RESPONSE TO SEXUAL
AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE] (discussing forms of sexual and gender-based violence which occur in home,
community, and culture; forms can be physical, sexual and psychological). See UNHCR, HANDBOOK FOR
REGISTRATION: PROCEDURES AND STANDARDS FOR REGISTRATION, POPULATION DATA MANAGEMENT AND
DOCUMENTATION, pt. 1 at 9, ¶ 5 (Apr. 25, 2002) available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgibin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?id=3f8e93e9a&tbl=MEDIA [hereinafter UNHCR, HANDBOOK FOR REGISTRATION]
(emphasizing dangers refugee girls face “particularly at risk of being excluded from or abused during the
registration process.”).
77
See UNHCR, PREVENTION AND RESPONSE TO SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE , supra note 76, at 4
(“There are many factors contributing to acts of sexual and gender-based violence in any setting. In general, the
overriding causes are gender inequity, assertion of power, and lack of respect for human rights.”). See also
UNHCR, HANDBOOK FOR REGISTRATION, supra note 76, pt. 1 at 10, ¶ 1 (“Humanitarian workers may extort bribes
or sexual favors from teenage girls in exchange for access to registration formalities.”).

20

discussed above.78 UNCHR’S efforts to address those issues through targeted programs for
women and children79 have not been sufficient, and the conditions remain in place today.
Poverty, in large part a consequence of budget shortfalls and lack of funding, has resulted
in a shortage of food, clothing and other goods in many camps.80 Shortages have in turn led to
one of the main gender- and age-specific harms prevalent in refugee camps: sexual exploitation.
Aid workers, camp managers and camp residents have forced women and girls to engage in
sexual bartering in order to secure vital, scarce items.81 Shortages also create health hazards
particular to women, such as lack of nutrition for nursing mothers and lack of sanitary
products.82
Shortages, particularly of fuel, also highlight how camp management and design
contribute to camp conditions particularly harmful to women and children. In refugee camps
throughout the world, women and girls are responsible for preparing the family’s meals. That
includes gathering fuel with which to cook the meals. Refugee camps, however, tend to be short
of firewood and other cooking fuel, necessitating that women and girls travel outside the camp
for it. The distance of many refugee camps from urban centers, and the erosion of natural
78

See GAO, Humanitarian Assistance, supra note 27, at 3. Cultural relativism is also to blame for the proliferation
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resources that may have existed nearby prior to the refugee influx,83 often require that women
and girls travel significant distances, sometimes up to thirty kilometers, to forage for fuel.84
Upon exiting the camp, however, the women and girls face a much higher risk of attacks from
locals, bandits, police and other potential attackers.85
Poor camp management and design also prevent female refugees from accessing even the
minimal protection that UNHCR or other camp-administrating NGO’s can provide.
Registration, for example, though necessary in order to come formally under the protection of the
organization running the camp, is often inaccessible to women and children due to lack of shade,
water and other amenities necessary for women with children who must spend protracted periods
of time awaiting processing.86 As a result, males, the traditional heads of households, tend to
register the family without the presence of female and child family members. In many such
cases, the practice has been to provide only the “head of the family” with a registration card
listing other family members. Not only does this practice permit the male head of the family to
identify which members of his family should receive official refugee protection, but it gives him
alone the right to receive the family’s rations.87 Many women and children thus remain faceless
and unable to access protection and basic necessities.
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Patriarchal cultural attitudes also contribute heavily to gender- and age-specific harm in
refugee camps. As discussed above, males, traditionally considered the “head of the household,”
often have the ability to conceal family members over whom they wish to retain control. One
example of family members most at risk under this system include young girls for whom,
depending on the culture, early marriage may bring a high bride price or dispense with the need
to pay a dowry.88 Another example is unrelated children, usually girls, living with families and
providing unpaid labor.89 Heads of households thus may have a financial disincentive for
registering some children. Patriarchal cultural attitudes validate and reinforce the concealment
of women and children and their submission to the will of the head of the household.90
The growing industry of human trafficking also poses grave danger for women and
children in refugee settings .91 Refugee camp poverty has created a lucrative market for human
traffickers who prey on vulnerable people, especially women and children, and dupe them into
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See UNHCR, HANDBOOK FOR REGISTRATION, supra note 76, pt. 1 at 10 (noting some girls who attempt to register
may encounter extortion for sexual favors and other abuse from humanitarian workers).
89
See id. at 9-10, (explaining why young girls are not registered at camps because of status as unpaid labor or to not
interfere with dowries).
90
See generally Ward, supra note 9 (detailing patriarchal attitudes and their consequences in refugee populations
throughout world). For example, due to patriarchal attitudes in the Congo, domestic violence is the norm, polygamy
and adultery are permitted for men but punished if committed by a woman, and dowry and inheritance laws severely
inhibit women’s independence. Id. at 22. Cultural attitudes in Afghanistan (before, during and after the Taliban)
have included requiring women to cover their entire body while in public, holding women responsible for sexual
violence inflicted upon them, and denying employment to women. Id at 46-47. East Timorese refugees are subject
to Indonesian patriarchal cultural attitudes that favor polygamy, male domination within the family, and bias
towards men in divorce proceedings. Id. at 62. Azerbaijani refugees maintain patriarchal cultural attitudes evident
in the underemployment of women, exclusion of female leadership in both the public and private sphere, and the
vesting of family authority in men to the extent that men have the right to cast election ballots for female members
of the family. Id. at 72.
91
See generally JOHN MORRISON & BETH CROSLAND, THE TRAFFICKING AND SMUGGLING OF REFUGEES: THE END
GAME IN EUROPEAN ASYLUM POLICY? 1-2 (UNHCR New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 39, Apr.
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slavery with promises of legitimate work or marriage abroad.92 The desire to escape the refugee
camp also leads refugees to fall prey to traffickers offering to smuggle refugees into other
countries, but who then endanger and exploit the refugee during or at the conclusion of the
journey.93
UNCHR efforts have proven to be far from sufficient in addressing gender- and agerelated violence and hardship in its refugee camps. Women with husbands often struggle to feed
their children. Children with parents face bleak futures and wasted years. Yet single mothers
and abandoned children, as well as women and children who suffer abuse at the hands of their
would-be protectors, encounter an added layer of hardship and stigmatization.
2.

A New Crisis Calls for a New Solution

In the post-9/11 world, refugees have been recast as national security threats. Many do
not have proof of identity.94 Many are Muslim and hail from predominantly Muslim countries.95
The vast majority lives in conditions of desperate poverty that foment violence and desperation.
For these reasons, refugees now endure significantly more scrutiny prior to being granted
admittance to the United States.
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The situation of particularly vulnerable female and child refugees thus deteriorated even
further after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon. As part of its response to the attacks, the United States immediately suspended
refugee resettlement for several months.96 During that time, the U.S. government carried out
new background checks and investigations of family relationships. The U.S. concluded that
approximately forty percent of family-based, or P-3, refugees accepted for resettlement had
committed fraud during the application process and did not actually have the relationship with
their sponsors that they claimed to have.97
When the U.S. refugee resettlement program did resume in February 2002, it was with the
implementation of new, far stricter security mechanisms that apply even to the highest priority
refugees. First, refugees, including those already accepted for resettlement, now have to undergo
new security checks prior to gaining admission to the United States.98 Even prior to 9/11, the
U.S. State Department checked all applicants for resettlement against the Refugee Information
Entry Sub-system of the Consular Lookout and Support System (“CLASS”), a database searched
using names and dates of birth.99 CLASS contains the names of persons for whom the State
96
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Department has information, usually derogatory, pertaining to the individuals’ application for
entry into the United States.100 In the post-9/11 era, the results of the CLASS check must now be
completed and documented before resettlement offices may proceed any further on the case.101
Although the U.S. State Department claims that the security checks now only take forty-five
days to process, they took several months when these changes first came into effect.102
Other post-9/11 security measures, while not particularly time consuming compared to the
CLASS check, have delayed travel in another respect: they have caused the amount of available
flights for refugees to decrease significantly.103 As of November 2001, all refugees who are
fourteen years old or older at the time of their entry into the United States must undergo full
fingerprinting upon arrival in the United States.104 This process is so cumbersome that the
government initially imposed a thirty-person per flight limit on refugees,105 a limit which
improvements in fingerprinting efficiency have allowed to increase only to thirty-five refugees
per flight.106 Adding to the need for a per flight limit on refugees is the 2002 Enhanced Border
Security and Visa Entry Reform Act107 requirement that all refugees receive an employment
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authorization document “immediately upon [their] arrival in the United States” and that the
document contain a photograph and fingerprint.108
The cumulative result of these measures is that thousands of refugees selected for
resettlement who have been anticipating imminent departure and the start of a new life have
reverted to the anxious waiting and uncertainty that had characterized the last several years of
their lives. The United States, although it authorized the admission of 70,000 refugees,109 only
admitted 27,029 refugees in fiscal year 2002.110 Fiscal year 2003 saw almost the same low
number of refugee entries.111 In fiscal year 2004, the United States fell short of its refugee
admission ceiling by 17,125.112
One obvious step the United States can take to correct the refugee backlog is to increase the
number of refugee slots available to make up for the tens of thousands who have been left behind
in the wake of 9/11. The refugee statute specifically permits the President to increase the
number of refugees admitted if such an increase “is justified by humanitarian concerns or is
otherwise in the national interest.”113 The Bush Administration, however, has declined to do so,
citing “the challenges of global insecurity, the logistical difficulty of accessing remote locations,
and the changing face of refugee populations around the world.”114 Moreover, increasing the
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number of available slots will not lead to an increase in arrivals absent a streamlining of the
entire resettlement process.
The global insecurity and threats against the United States upon which President Bush
based his refusal to increase the refugee resettlement quotahave indeed posed a significant
challenge to refugee processing. Attacks by combatants in volatile areas against aid workers,115
volunteer medical personnel116 and foreign officials117 combine with U.S. security measures to
slow the process considerably.118 Moreover, the very situations from which refugees are trying to
escape present enormous obstacles to their goal. Forced displacement, violence, lack of
infrastructure, illness and lack of stability are not ideal conditions for preserving formal identity
documents such as passports, birth certificates, marriage certificates and the like. Many refugees
thus commence the resettlement process with two substantial strikes against them: the inability
to prove conclusively who they are and why they are refugees, and the presumption that they are
involved with terrorism.
How real, however, is the threat posed by refugees? It is worth noting that the nineteen
hijackers shared only one of the above characteristics applied to refugees: they were Muslims
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from Muslim countries.119 All had passports with which to enter the United States, many of
which contained legal visas.120 Many came from well-to-do families, some of whom were
shocked by and in denial of their relatives’ involvement.121 None of the hijackers were refugees,
or applicants for refugee status.
That is not to say that a refugee could not be a terrorist, or that refugees should not be
closely screened to detect past criminal activity or presence on a terrorist watch list. However,
the methods and duration of such investigations do not correspond with the level of threat posed
by applicants for various immigration benefits. For example, the United States suspended its
refugee resettlement program in response to the September 11, 2001 resettlement attacks;
however, it continued its expedited processing of nonimmigrant visas in Saudi Arabia.122 This
occurred despite the fact that thirteen of the eighteen hijackersfrom Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates had received their visas through expedited processing.123
In light of the new challenges facing the U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program and its
diminishing ability to reconcile national security concerns with the urgent needs of refugees, the
most vulnerable refugees require a new legislative remedy. The most effective and expedient
method for the United States to revive its commitment to refugees while maintaining security
vigilance is to create an expedited visa system for a limited number of female and child refugees,
119
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specifically those at risk of harm due to their sex and/or age. Such a system would remove
qualified refugees from the resettlement backlog quagmire without creating the perennially
feared flood of immigrants to the United States. Moreover, it would give a logical preference for
resettlement to a group whose members face a high risk of being subjected to harm if they
remain in refugee camps but present a low national security risk to the United States.
III.

Expedited visa relief for vulnerable refugees: The “W” visa.

A non-immigrant visa that requires beneficiaries to complete certain security-related tasks
prior to receiving permanent immigration status in the United States may present an opportunity
to reconcile national security concerns with urgent humanitarian needs. I propose a W visa,
which would benefit two groups of at-risk women and children living in refugee settings: (1)
those who have been approved for resettlement but whose travel has been delayed indefinitely
due to travel restrictions;124 and (2) those who, like Sahra and Amina, fail to qualify for lower
priority resettlement (due to lack of immediate family ties) or to be timely identified for high
priority resettlement.125 All women and children in refugee settings who demonstrate a credible
fear of harm based on their sex and or age would qualify for the W visa, subject to an annual
numerical limit.
At-risk female and child refugee camp-dwellers approved for resettlement since September
11, 2001 who have not departed for the United States due to travel restrictions would be the first
to benefit from the W visa.126 Normally, such refugees will already have received security and
health clearances but encounter delays related to numeric travel restrictions for refugees. W visa
holders would still be subject to the stateside verification, fingerprinting and employment
124
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authorization issuance to which other refugees are subject, but it need not occur immediately
upon entry into the United States.127 W visa holders would comply with the same security
measures with which other travelers to the United States must comply, but would not be subject
to the more onerous and time consuming security measures to which refugees must submit upon
entry. W visa holders would thereby avoid the thirty-five-refugee limit on flights to the United
States.
At- risk women and children who do not qualify for P-3 resettlement with their family
members, such as Sahra and Amina, also would be eligible to apply immediately for a W visa.
Rather than receive a denial of their resettlement applications, resettlement officials would
convert their cases into applications for W visas. Thus, family relationships failing to meet the
requisite level of immediacy for resettlement purposes would not result in the stranding of an atrisk woman or child.
Providing visas to individuals facing hardship has a strong foundation in U.S. immigration
law. Current immigration law provides relief in the form of immigrant visas and nonimmigrant
visas to several vulnerable groups, including battered spouses of U.S. citizens and lawful
permanent residents; abandoned or orphaned children; and victims of trafficking. Each visa
category is specifically tailored to a narrow group of individuals in particular need of protection.
Last year, Congress considered a measure that would provide a permanent immigrant visa to
women and children fearing sex- and age-related harm.128 The Widows and Orphans Act of
2003 (“WOA”) created a new category of special immigrant visas for females or children with “a
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credible fear of harm related to” their sex or age129 and “a lack of adequate protection from such
harm.”130 It did not contain a statutory limit or specifically pertain to refugees, although its
drafters focused on refugees in their promotional literature and legislative roll-out.131 The bill,
despite bipartisan support,132 remained stalled in the Judiciary Committee after its introduction in
June 2003.
The legislation proposed in this Article differs in several respects from the WOA. First, it
pertains not to all women and children with a credible fear of harm, but only to women and
children living in refugee settings. Second, it advocates a non-immigrant rather than an
immigrant visa. Third, it contains an annual numerical limitation. Each of these provisions and
the rationale behind them are discussed below.
A. W Visa Eligibility Requirements
1.

Applicants Must Dwell in a Refugee Setting.

For practical purposes, the W visa is not intended for women and children worldwide
who fear gender- and age-based harm. It specifically targets women and children in refugee
settings in countries of first asylum, who are at greater risk of harm within the refugee setting
because of their sex and/or age. In most cases, beneficiaries will have already demonstrated that
they meet the statutory definition of a refugee. The visa also wouldbe available, however, to
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those who do not necessarily meet the statutory definition of a refugee due to the gender basis of
their fear of harm.
2.

Applicants Must Demonstrate that They Have a Credible Fear of Harm Due to Their Sex
and/or Age.
Most refugees live in fear of the violence, sickness and shortage of resources that

characterizes refugee settings. The relief proposed in this Article, however, pertains to a limited
group of persons in refugee settings whose vulnerability exceeds that of the general refugee
population. Applicants for the limited, emergency relief proposed herein must therefore
demonstrate that they have a credible fear of harm due to their sex and/or age.
The Widows and Orphans Act would have required that an applicant demonstrate a
“credible fear of harm”133 in order to qualify for relief, and the proposed W visa adopts this
standard. The “credible fear of harm” standard is a welcome departure from the U.S. refugee
law standard, which requires that an applicant demonstrate a “well-founded fear of
persecution.”134 First, “credible fear” is a lower standard than “well-founded fear”, which
requires an analysis of whether the applicant possesses a characteristic that her persecutors wish
133

Widows and Orphans Act, S.1353, 108th Cong. § 2(a)(3)(N)(ii)(II)(bb) & 2(a)(3)(N)(i)(II)(bb) (2003) (requiring
applicants to establish a credible fear of harm). The term “credible fear” derives from the expedited removal portion
of the immigration statute. See generally 8 USC § 1225 (1996). For purposes of expedited removal, an applicant
possesses a “credible fear” if she demonstrates a “significant possibility. . . that [she] could establish eligibility for
asylum.” 8 USC § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v) (1996). In expedited removal proceedings, if the applicant fails to demonstrate a
significant possibility of success in an asylum hearing in front of an immigration judge, the DHS may deport her
without further review. See 8 USC § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (1996) (if determined inadmissible “the officer shall order the
alien removed from the United States without further hearing or review unless the alien indicates either an intention
to apply for asylum…or a fear of persecution”). An immigration judge may review a negative credible fear
determination. See 8 C.F.R § 208.30(g)(1) (2005). However, many credible fear applicants do not have access to an
attorney and are held in detention. Michele R. Pistone, Justice Delayed is Justice Denied: A Proposal for Ending
the Unnecessary Detention of Asylum Seekers, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 197, 211-212, Spring 1999. The
combination of lack of representation and possibility of prolonged detention discourage many applicants from
seeking immigration judge review of their negative credible fear determinations. The combination of lack of
representation and possibility of prolonged detention discourage many applicants from seeking immigration judge
review of their negative credible fear determinations. Id. at 224. Immigration officials carried out 43,248 expedited
removals in fiscal year 2003, accounting for twenty-three percent of all removals that year. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
DEPT. OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Immigration Information: Statistical Yearbook (2003), at 149 , available at
http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/ybpage.htm. Government statistics do not indicate how many of
those removals were of people who had expressed fear of returning to their countries. See generally Id.
134
8 USC § 1101(a)(42)(A), I.N.A. §101(a)(42(A) (2000).
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to overcome through punishment, whether the persecutors are aware that the applicant possesses
the characteristic, and whether they have the capability and inclination to punish the applicant.135
Second, the term “harm” clearly denotes suffering that does not necessarily rise to the
level of persecution, and thus eliminates a great deal of the subjectivity involved with refugee
determinations. The Refugee Convention does not define “persecution” but rather leaves it to
individual countries to interpret the term. The United States has followed the Convention and
declined to define “persecution” by statute or regulation, but has rather left it up to the courts to
decide when harm rises to the level of persecution.136
Generally, most courts agree that harm rises to the level persecution if it is severe in
nature. Courts also have found, however, that severe harm alone does not constitute persecution
under U.S. refugee and asylum law; rather, a government or an entity whom the government
cannot or will not control must commit the harm.137 Due to the often private nature of genderbased harm, adjudicating gender-based cases has proven to be a thorn in the side of U.S. courts
and asylum adjudicators.138

135

Matter of Mogharabbi, 19 I&N Dec. 439, 445(1987).

136

See Blanco de Belbruno v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 272, 285(4th Cir. 2004) (holding that shots fired at the applicant’s
home and threatening phone calls does not rise to the level of persecution); Khalil v. Ashcroft, 337 F.3d 50, 55 (1st
Cir. 2003) (holding that denial of building permits and subjection to frequent lawsuits does not constitute
persecution); Milhalev v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 722, 730 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that detention for ten days
accompanied by daily beatings and hard labor constitutes persecution, even in the absence of serious physical
injury).
137

See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42)(A), INA § 101 (as amended) (2000); see also Llana-Castellon v. INS, 16 F.3d
1093, 1097-98 (10th Cir.1994) (stating that the persecutor must be the government of one whom the government
cannot or will not control); Galicia v. Ashcroft, 2005 WL 175500 *1 (1st Cir.) (2005) (stating that the persecutor
must be aligned with the government or uncontrollable).
138
See Laura S. Adams, Fleeing the Family: A Domestic Violence Victim’s Particular Social Group, 49 Loy. L.
Rev. 287, 287 (2003) (“[O]ne of the primary arguments against granting refugee status to domestic violence victims
is that domestic violence is private in nature and therefore is not the type of politically motivate harm entitled to
international protection under refugee law”).
The best example of the United States’ ongoing struggle with how to deal with domestic violence victims
seeking asylum is the case Matter of R-A-, 22 I&N Dec. 906 (BIA 1999). Matter of R-A- is the case of Ms. Rodi
Alvarado Peña, a woman from Guatemala who was subjected to severe abuse between 1984 and 1994. Center for
Gender and Refugee Studies, Rodi Alvarado’s Story, at http://sierra.uchastings.edu/cgrs/campaigns/update.htm (last
visited Feb.9, 2005). Her husband raped and sodomized her, broke windows and mirrors with her head, dislocated
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The W visa, like the WOA, would endeavor to avoid the pitfalls associated with fitting
gender and age-based harm into the fairly narrow parameters of the U.S. interpretation of the
Refugee Convention.139 Applicants for the W visa must show that they live in a refugee setting
and have credible fear of harm on account of one or both of the protected characteristics: age
and sex. Women who can demonstrate, for example, that the male head of the household is
unable to provide the protection that is expected in the refugee’s culture due to illness or
disability, or that the male head of the household subjects or intends to subject them to harm,
would meet this requirement without having to show further proof of actual or imminent harm.
The same would apply to unaccompanied minors, particularly because their age and lack of
proper adult care renders them susceptible to trafficking and sexual exploitation. Moreover, the

her jaw, pistol-whipped her, threw a machete at her, and kicked her violently in the spine while she was pregnant.
Id. Ms. Alvarado’s repeatedly attempted to flee or husband and to obtain protection, to no avail. Id. The authorities
refused to intervene because it was a “domestic matter.” Id. Ms. Alvarado’s husband threatened to “cut off her
arms and legs, and...leave her in a wheelchair, if she ever tried to leave him.” Id.
Ms. Alvarado finally fled to the U.S. and sought asylum. Id. Her attorneys argued that Ms. Alvarado belonged
to a social group consisting of “Guatemalan women who have been involved intimately with Guatemalan male
companions who believe that women are to live under male domination.” Id. The immigration judge found that Ms.
Alvarado qualified for asylum and granted it. Id. The government appealed. Id. The BIA reversed the immigration
judge’s decision, holding that the social group as defined “was not recognized and understood to be a societal
faction or otherwise a recognizable segment of the population.” Id.
Attorney General Janet Reno vacated the BIA’s decision and issued proposed regulations recognizing genderrelated persecution claims. 65 Fed. Reg. 76588 (2000). The proposed regulations have never become final. In an
order dated February 21, 2003, Attorney General John Ashcroft certified the BIA’s decision for his own review
pursuant to 8 CFR § 1003.1(h)(1)(i) and on December 8, 2003 ordered new briefings from the government and Ms.
Alvarado’s attorneys. Order of the Attorney General, In re Matter of Rodi Alvarado Pena, A.G. Oder No. 26962003, available at http://sierra.uchastings.edu/cgrs/documents/legal/ag-briefing12-03.pdf. In the conclusion to its
brief, the government stated that “Alvarado has established statutory eligibility for asylum” and recommended that
the Attorney General “remand this case to the Board with instructions to grant asylum without opinion.” DHS Brief,
Matter of R-A, Feb. 19, 2004, 43, available at http://sierra.uchastings.edu/cgrs/documents/legal/dhs_brief_ra.pdf.
On January 19, 2005, the Attorney General declined to follow the government’s recommendation and instead
remanded the case to the BIA with instructions to await the final version of the 2000 proposed regulations. Center
for Gender and Refugee Studies, Landmark Decisions Delayed Once Again, Jan. 21, 2005, available at
http://sierra.uchastings.edu/cgrs/documents/media/cgrs_release_1-05.pdf.
139
See generally, Canadian Council for Refugees, Network on Women Fleeing Gender Based Persecution,
Newsletter: Issue 1, May 29, 2000, available at http://www.web.net/~ccr/newsgend.htm#DENMARK (last visited
Feb. 18, 2005) (discussing treatment of gender claims in Europe). Unlike U.S. law, laws in Denmark, Ireland,
Norway provide refugee protection for women fleeing gender based violence. Id. See also, Refugee Law Center,
Inc., GENDER ASYLUM LAW IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES: DECISION AND GUIDELINES (1999) available at
http://www.web.net/~ccr/newsgend.htm#II (providing reprints of gender asylum law guidelines, case summaries and
decisions from the United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand).
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harm need not be committed by a government or entity which the government cannot or will not
control. In the case of refugees living in countries of first asylum, it is often a family member,
local bandit, corrupt aid worker or trafficker who has committed or seeks to commit harm against
the most vulnerable of the refugees.
B.

Non-immigrant Visas and Immigrant Visas

As mentioned briefly above, the United States has a history of providing immigration
solutions to particularly vulnerable individuals. These come in the form of both immigrant and
non-immigrant visas. An individual living abroad who obtains an immigrant visa to the United
States assumes lawful permanent resident status immediately upon entering the United States.140
Non-immigrant visas, on the other hand, do not confer lawful permanent resident status on their
holders. Their duration varies from a few days to several years, depending on the type of nonimmigrant visa issued.141 Those discussed below provide interim status to persons intending to
immigrate permanently. The applicants for such visas usually must comply with several
requirements prior to gaining permanent immigration status.
1.

Existing Models of Immigrant and Non-immigrant Visas for Vulnerable Groups
a. Special Immigrant Visas

140

Applicants for immigrant visas must have an approved petition by a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident
immediate family member, a U.S. business, or a self-petition based on extraordinary ability. INA § 213A, 8 USC §
1183(A) (1996). All eligibility interviews, security checks and medical exams take place prior to entering the United
States. Martin, Reforms, supra note 16, at 129.Immigrant visas are also available for individuals already within the
United States. INA §245; 8 USCA § 1255(i) (2003). Persons residing in the U.S. who apply for and receive an
immigrant visa may adjust their status to that of a lawful permanent resident if they meet other eligibility
requirements. Id.
140
Tourists and persons in the United States on business trips, for example, may receive permission to remain in the
United States from a few days to several months. 9 FAM § 41.31. Students may remain for as long as they are
enrolled in school and attending classes. 8 CFR § 214.2(f) (2005). Persons who apply for such visas usually must
demonstrate non-immigrant intent; that is, that they are ready, willing and able to return to their countries of origin
once they have completed their objective in coming to the United States. 9 FAM § 41.31.
141
See 9 FAM § 41.31 (indicating that tourists and persons in the United States on business trips, for example, may
receive permission to remain in the United States from a few days to several months). Persons who apply for such
visas usually must demonstrate non-immigrant intent; that is, that they are ready, willing and able to return to their
countries of origin once they have completed their objective in coming to the United States. Id.

36

i. VAWA Self-petition
The Violence against Women Act (“VAWA”)142 provides spouses and children who are
victims of abuse committed by U.S. citizens (“USC’s”) and lawful permanent residents
(“LPR’s”) the ability to “self-petition” rather than rely on their abusive spouses for immigrant
petitions.143 Prior to the 1994 passage of VAWA, battered or psychologically abused spouses of
USCs and LPRs did not have immigration recourse if they chose to leave their abusive
relationships.144 A spouse who left an abusive relationship became an illegal alien with very
little chance of legalizing her immigration status, as did her non-U.S. citizen children. The
abusers thus had the power to use the threat of deportation to continue abusing their spouses and

142

Violence Against Women Act of 1993, HR 1133, 103d Cong. § 231(b) (codified at 8 U.S.C.A. §
1154(a)(1)(A)(iii) and (B)(ii) and (iii) ,INA § 204(a)(1)(A)(iii) and (B)(ii) and (iii) (1994)).
143
See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii) and (B)(ii) and (iii), INA § 204(a)(1)(A)(iii) and (B)(ii) and (iii) (1994)
(granting domestic violence victims the right to self petition). Contrary to popular belief, non-citizen spouses do not
incur any immigration benefits upon marriage to a USC or LPR. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES,
Immigration through a Family Member, available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/residency/family.htm (last
visited Feb. 18, 2005) [hereinafter Immigration through a Family Member]. Any benefit the spouses may receive is
contingent upon actions taken by the USCs and LPRs. Id. First, the USC or LPR must submit a petition to U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), a bureau within the Department of Homeland Security. 8 C.F.R. §
204.1(a)(1)(2005). Once CIS determines that a valid marriage has occurred and that the sponsoring party is a USC
or LPR, the bureau notifies the non-citizen spouse that she may apply to become an LPR, a process known as
adjustment of status. Immigration through a Family Member. The success of the adjustment of status application is
contingent on the marriage to the USC or LPR still being intact and sound at the time of the adjustment interview
and on the USC or LPR submitting an affidavit, supported by financial records, that he will support the non-citizen
spouse. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, Application Procedures: Becoming a Permanent Resident
While in the United States, available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/howdoi/LPRApplication.htm (last visited, Feb. 18,
2005).
144
See Committee on the Judiciary, Report on Violence Against Women Act, accompanying
H.R. Rep. No. 395, 103d Cong. 1st Sess. (1993):
Current law fosters domestic violence in such situations by placing full and complete control of the alien
spouse’s ability to gain permanent legal status in the hands of the citizen or lawful permanent resident
spouse. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident can, but is
not required to, file a relative visa petition requesting that his or her spouse be granted legal status based on
a valid marriage. Also, the citizen or lawful permanent resident can revoke such a petition at any time prior
to the issuance of permanent or conditional residency to the spouse. Consequently, a battered spouse may
be deterred from taking action to protect himself or herself, such as filing for a civil protection order, filing
criminal charges, or calling the police, because of the threat or fear of deportation. Many immigrant women
live trapped and isolated in violent homes, afraid to turn to anyone for help. They fear both continued abuse
if they stay with their batterers and deportation if they attempt to leave.
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stepchildren.145 VAWA allows abused spouses and children to self-petition without the consent
or knowledge of their abuser.
Under VAWA, a person qualifies for approval of a self-petition if she can show, inter
alia, that she is residing in the United States; has resided with the USC or LPR spouse in the
United States; and “has been battered by, or has been the subject of extreme mental cruelty
perpetrated by” the USC or LPR during the marriage (or is the parent of a child who has suffered
battery or extreme mental cruelty by the USC or LPR).146 An approval of a VAWA self-petition
allows the beneficiary and her minor children to apply for LPR status as if her spouse had
petitioned for them.147
ii. Special Immigrant Juvenile Visa
The Special Immigrant Juvenile Visa (“SIJV”) provides to abandoned and orphaned noncitizen children a means of gaining legal status.148 A provision of the Immigration Act of 1990,
the SIJV is available to minors present in the United States who have “been declared dependent
on a juvenile court located in the United States . . . and who [have] been deemed eligible by that
court for long-term foster care due to abuse, neglect or abandonment.”149 Children who qualify
for the SIJV are eligible to apply for LPR status.150
Congress created the SIJV to provide humanitarian assistance to undocumented children
living in the United States without adequate parental care.151 Many of the intended beneficiaries

145

Amy Gottlieb, The Violence Against Women Act: Remedies for Immigrant Victims of Domestic Violence, NEW
JERSEY LAWYER (Apr. 2004), at 2, available at
http://www.afsc.org/nymetro/immigrantRights/resources/NJLawyerArticleVAWA.pdf.
146
8 CFR § 204.2(c)(1) (2005).
147
Violence Against Women Act of 1993, HR 1133, 103d Cong. § 231(b) (granting victims of domestic violence the
right to self petition); (codified at INA § 204(a)(1)(A)(iii) and (B)(ii) and (iii), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii) and
(B)(ii) and (iii) (1994)).
148
8 USC §1101(a)(27)(J),INA § 101(a)(27)(J)(2000).
149
8 USC §1101(a)(27)(J)(i), INA § 101(a)(27)(J)(i) (2000
).
150
8 USC §1101(a)(27)(J), INA § 101(a)(27)(J), (2000) (according LPR status to recipients of the SIJV).
151
8 USC § 1101(a)(37(j)(i), INA § 101(a)(27)(J)(i) (2000); 8 CFR § 204.11(b) (2005).
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were street children from Central America who had lost their caretakers, been abandoned or
discarded by their caretakers, or left their caretakers due to abuse.152 Others were
unaccompanied minors who had been brought to the United States by smugglers, usually for the
purposes of forced labor or the sex trade.153 Still others were undocumented children living in
the United States with undocumented parents or caretakers who later died or abandoned the
children.154
Prior to the passage of the SIJV, such children faced dangers similar to those plaguing
orphaned or abandoned children in refugee camps. If deported to their native countries or forced
to remain underground as illegal immigrants in the United States, the children would likely have
little or no access to public services, no adult caretakers, and few, if any, educational
opportunities.155 As unaccompanied minors, they would have been prime targets for gangs,
militias, traffickers and other exploiters of children.156 The SIJV provided a solution, albeit not a
panacea,157 for a vulnerable group of children who otherwise had no entitlement to immigration
relief.

152

See Ang Lica Pence, Children Flee Alone from Central and South America: Part one of a Two Part Story, ARIZ.
DAILY STAR, January 15, 1995, available at 1995 WL 3272290 (discussing the increasing number of central and
south American children crossing the boarder in to the U.S.). See also, Symposium, Transatlantic Workshop On
'Unaccompanied/Separated Children: Comparative Policies And Practices In North America And Europe, 15
JRSTUD 102, 103-104 (2002) (discussing “street children or abandoned youth” from Central America).
153
Id. at 114 (discussing smugglers and the sex-trade industry).
154
See generally Id.
155
Sally Kinoshita and Katherine Brady, SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS FOR CHILDREN UNDER JUVENILE
COURT JURISDICTION (2005) at 2, available at http://www.ilrc.org/resources/sijs/2005%20SIJS%20benchbook.pdf.
156
For a discussion of the dangers present for female and child refugees, see supra notes 9-11 and accompanying
text.
157
The SIJV is still a relatively new remedy and one with several flaws. For example, a child who ceases to be
dependent on a juvenile court prior to adjusting to permanent resident status is subject to revocation of an approved
SIJV petition. 8 CFR § 205.1(a)(iv) (2005). This regulation fails to provide for children in states that terminate
juvenile dependency at the age of 18. Sarah Ignatius and Elisabeth S. Stickney, IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE
FAMILY § 14:79 (July 2003)[hereinafter IMLF]. Under the current regulations, children in such states lose their
eligibility for an SIJV even though the statute provides that children under 21 may qualify for an SIJV. 8 USC §
1101(a)(27)(J), INA § 101(a)(27)(J) (2000); see also 8 CFR § 204.11(c)(11) (2005). Moreover, recent amendments
to the INA have made it more difficult for SIJV applicants to qualify for a visa. IMLF § 14:79 (“Changes to the law
enacted by Congress in 1997 threaten to raise new challenges for certain potential special immigrant juveniles.”
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iii. Special Immigrant Visas for Amerasians (“SIV”)
In the 1980s, the United States created an immigration benefit in response to a
humanitarian crisis involving the offspring of U.S. servicemen and Southeast Asian158 women
that were conceived during the U.S. presence in Southeast Asian countries, predominantly
Vietnam, in the 1960s and 1970s.159 After the withdrawal of U.S. troops and the rise of the
communist government in Vietnam, children of U.S. servicemen, and often the children’s
mothers, became the targets of brutality, ostracism and discrimination at the hands of society and
even their own families.160 Although an orderly departure program161 was already in place for
individuals fleeing communist governments, the U.S. government created additional immigration
relief for the Amerasian children and their families.162

For example, DHS must now “expressly consent to the dependency order serving as a precondition to the
grant of special immigrant status.” 1998 Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-199, 111 Stat. 2440 § 113 (1997)
(codified at INA § 101(a)(27)(J)(iii), 8 USC § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii) (2000)). See IMLF § 14:79 (stating that youth are
ineligible unless DHS consents).
158
The term “Southeast Asian” refers to natives of Cambodia, Kampuchea, Korea, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam.
159
See Austin T. Fragomen, Alfred J. Del Rey, Jr., & Sam Bensen, Orphans and Amerasian Children, 1 ILMB §
3:13 (2004).
160
See generally Benjamin Hu, “Amerasians: Neither Here nor There; Bill Would Naturalize GIs’ Children,”
WASH. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2004, available at 2004 WL 64153142 [hereinafter Hu, Amerasians].
161
U.S. CONSULATE, REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT SECTION, About Us, available at
http://hochiminh.usconsulate.gov/wwwhref.html (explaining ODP).
ODP (based in Bangkok, Thailand) was an extraordinarily successful program that resettled nearly
500,000 Vietnamese refugees and immigrants in the United States. It was established in January 1980,
under a Memorandum of Agreement between the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and
the government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, to provide certain Vietnamese nationals in Vietnam
a safe and legal means of departing the country. Initially, the United States and twenty-nine other
nations participated in ODP, and under its auspices the U.S. processed for admission to the United States
both refugee and immigrant visa beneficiaries. By the late 1980s, the refugee component of the U.S.
ODP program focused primarily on those Vietnamese who either were detained in re-education camps for
a minimum of three years because of their close association with pre-1975 U.S. programs and policies
in Vietnam, or had been direct-hire employees of the USG for five or more years. On September 30,
1994, after fourteen years, registration for ODP refugee programs was closed. Prior to the deadline, the
USG made a concerted effort to ensure that information about the registration deadline was disseminated
in both Vietnam and the United States. The USG made the decision to end registration after determining
that sufficient time had passed to permit persons interested in resettling in the United States to apply for a
refugee interview. ODP itself closed in September 1999, and remaining case files were handed off to the
Refugee Resettlement Section (RRS) of the U.S. Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City.
Id.
See Hu, Amerasians, supra note 160 (explaining immigration relief the United States created for Amerasians).
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The plight of Amerasian children is comparable to the experiences of refugee women
who are single heads of households (or abused by the male head of the household) and
unaccompanied refugee minors. They have experienced various forms of abuse and domestic
violence, including sexual abuse; they have experienced gender and class discrimination; the
absence of a father has imposed an additional burden of social stigma and psychological stress
beyond the difficulties of everyday life in postwar Vietnam; and they have encountered
disproportionate difficulty in obtaining education and employment.163
Upon learning of the bleak lives of Amerasian children, and recognizing its responsibility
to those children, the U.S. government passed two relief acts authorizing their entrance into the
United States under special, non-refugee status.164 First, the 1982 act to amend the Immigration
and Nationality Act to provide preferential treatment in the admission of certain children of
United States Armed Forces Personnel offered permanent residency status to Southeast Asian
Amerasians.165 It did not, however, make provisions for their mothers or other family
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See Melinda Beck, Frank Gibney, Shawn Doherty, Holly Morris, Melinda Lu, Michael Reese and Monroe
Anderson, Where is My Father?, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 15, 1983, at 55-57 (describing the severe discrimination and
hardship that Amerasians and their mothers have experienced in their countries of birth). Tonette Orejas, “What
about Us?” Amerasians Ask, PHILLIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, March 5, 2003 (detailing the hardships Amerasians have
experienced and continue to experience today). See also, 131 Cong. Rec. H1369-01, (1985) (statement of statement
of Rep. Smith, New Jersey) (“Amerasian children are currently the object of either official or unofficial
discrimination in the countries where they now reside. Vietnamese officials have called the problem of Amerasian
children a burden, saying that their living conditions are generally worse than other Vietnamese children.… Since
the Amerasian child has been abandoned by his or her American father, the opportunities for social acceptance, a
good education, job, and marriage are almost nonexistent.”); 133 Cong. Rec. E1687-01 (1987) (statement of Hon.
Stewart B. McKinney) ( “Many of these children, because of their mixed parentage, have been treated as outcasts in
their respective countries, where they face a life full of hatred and bitter discrimination.”); 149 Cong. Rec. E2104-01
(2003) (statement of Rep. Lofgren) (“Amerasian children] have lived through devastation during the Vietnam War,
[and] have been mistreated by the Vietnamese government because of their mixed race …”).
164
See Bring the Dust Children Home, NEW YORK TIMES, July 12, 1982 available at 1982 WLNR 308158 (stating
“for the children to be labeled refugees would paint Vietnam as a persecutor in world opinion”). The term “refugee”
indicates that the person is fleeing persecution, casting the country from which they arrive in a negative light. Id.
The non-refugee legislation thus represented an attempt at neutrality during a time of poor relations between the
United States and Vietnam. Id.
165
1982 Act to Amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to Provide Preferential Treatment in the Admission of
Certain Children of United States Armed Forces Personnel, Pub. L. No. 97-539, 96 Stat. 1716 (1982).
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members.166 Subsequent legislation, the 1987 Amerasian Homecoming Act, bestowed status
upon Amerasians born in Vietnam between 1962 and 1976 and their families.167 A bill proposed
in 2003 that would have granted automatic citizenship to Amerasians, however, was not
successful.168
b. Non-immigrant Visas
i. “T” Visas
Responding to an international humanitarian crisis involving the trafficking169 of children
and young women for sexual and labor exploitation, Congress passed the Victims of Trafficking
and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (“VTVPA”).170 The VTVPA was a response to the
growing trade in children and young adults for forced sexual and manual labor and the lack of

166

Hu, Amerasians, supra note 160.
Amerasian Homecoming Act of 1987, 100 Pub. L. No. 202, 101 Stat. 1329 (1987).
168
Amerasian Naturalization Act of 2003, H.R. 3360, 108th Cong. (2003).
169
See UNHCR, Convention on the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and the Exploitation of the Prostitution of
Others (1949 – revised in 1994), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/33.htm (defining trafficking as:
167

illicit and clandestine movement of persons across national and international borders, largely from
developing countries and some countries with economies in transition, with the end goal of forcing women
and girl children into sexually or economically oppressive and exploitative situations for the profit of
recruiters, traffickers, and crime syndicates, as well as other illegal activities related to trafficking, such as
forced domestic labor, false marriages, clandestine employment, and false adoption.)

See also, UNHCR,Protocol To Prevent, Suppress And Punish Trafficking In Persons, Especially Women And
Children, Supplementing The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (2003), available
at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crime_cicp_convention.html#final (defining trafficking as:
…the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of
force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position
of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person
having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.
Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of
sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the
removal of organs.)
170

Victims of Trafficking And Violence Protection Act Of 2000, Pub. L. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1478 (2000).
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adequate legislative means to address it.171 According to State Department estimates, traffickers
smuggle as many as 50,000 women and children172 into the United States every year and force
them to work in sweatshops, farms, strip clubs or brothels.173
Trafficked women and children usually come from poor towns and villages in Asia,
Eastern Europe and Latin America. Many have fallen prey to kidnappers, family members who
have sold them for cash, or duplicitous agents who purport to arrange legitimate employment. 174
Traffickers confiscate their victims’ passports and use various forms of physical and
psychological coercion to force their victims to provide labor or sexual services.175
Prior to the passage of the VTVPA, victims of trafficking had little recourse in
immigration law. If they escaped their traffickers or were arrested during a raid, they faced
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almost certain deportation.176 The lack of recourse was a tremendous source of power and
control for the traffickers.
The VTVPA created a new non-immigrant visa, called the T visa, to provide temporary
relief to victims of trafficking crimes. The T visa allows victims of the most severe forms of
trafficking, defined in part as “sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force,
fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such act has not attained 18 years
of age,”177 to remain in the United States temporarily (sometimes permanently), receive federal
and state assistance, and receive police protection.178 In fiscal year 2003, the Department of
Homeland Security approved 297 applications for the T visa.179
ii. “V” Visa
Immigrant visa quotas follow a priority system that limits the number of persons
allowed to immigrate to the United States based on the immigration status of the sponsoring
relative. Spouses and minor children of U.S. citizens have priority and may apply to adjust their
status or immigrate to the United States upon approval of the U.S. citizen’s petition, whereas
spouses and minor children of LPRs fall into the second-preference category and are subject to
its numerical restrictions. As a result, spouses and children of LPRs must wait for an available
visa number to become eligible for permanent residency, even if the government has approved a
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petition filed by their LPR relative. Due to the growing number of petitions and the static
number of available visas, a backlog of more than four years has accrued,180 during which time
the beneficiary usually must wait outside the United States.181
The V visa provided a creative, though temporary, solution to the situation that faced
LPRs and their immediate family members. The V visa allows persons whose LPR spouses or
parents filed petitions at least three years prior to December 22, 2000182 to enter the United
States as non-immigrants.183 The V visa holders are entitled to live and work in the United
States until immigrant visas become available.184 At that time, the V visa holders may apply to
adjust their status to permanent residency in the United States.
2.

Obtaining Lawful Permanent Residence Through a W Visa

The drafters of the Widows and Orphans Act suggested that beneficiaries enter the
United States as immigrants, rather than non-immigrants, through a form of entry called
humanitarian parole.185 There are two reasons that such a plan may not be conducive to
expeditious processing. First, because an immigrant visa confers permanent residence on its
beneficiary, it is necessary that full security checks be completed prior to the issuance of the visa.
Furthermore, the bill stipulates that WOA petitions be completed and beneficiaries paroled into
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the United States within forty-five days of the submission of the application.186 Currently,
refugee security checks alone take forty-five days.187 It is highly unlikely that adjudication, full
security checks and travel arrangements could be conducted properly in the timeframe imposed
by the WOA. The more likely result is that yet another backlog would develop or that errors
would occur due to hasty processing.
Second, humanitarian parole is a highly discretionary form of relief which the U.S.
government utilizes only in extraordinary and exigent situations or when doing so would satisfy
a significant public interest.188 Adjudicators must consider applications for humanitarian parole
on a case-by-case basis, and may only grant those which they deem urgent. 189 Once an individual
receives humanitarian parole, she does not technically make an entry into the United States;
rather, she is permitted to remain in the United States for a limited period of time until such time
as parole is revoked or she changes to a more permanent status.190
The W visa would adopt the formula of those non-immigrant visas that are a stepping
stone to lawful permanent resident status. Rather than confer permanent status on refugees for
whom newly added security and eligibility checks could not be completed in a timely fashion,
the law would grant them temporary non-immigrant status. A forty-five day time limit would be
more feasible in this context and a necessary precaution against potentially life-threatening
delays. Similarly, visa holders would have to comply with the additional security and eligibility
checks (fingerprint and photo verification, for example) within thirty days of entering the United
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States. Like other refugees, W visa holders would be eligible to apply for lawful permanent
residence one year after their entry into the United States.191
C. Less is More: Statutory Limit
In order to help the most vulnerable and at-risk refugees in a timely and effective manner
during a time of increased hostility to non-citizens, an annual statutory limit is a necessary
requirement for a bill intended to expedite the processing of refugees. A bill which allows for an
unlimited flow of newcomers will not likely find favor among lawmakers in today’s Congress,
even among those lawmakers who recognize the desperate plight of abandoned female and child
refugee camp dwellers. The reality of today’s legislative attitude towards immigration, even
refugees, is that the fewer non-citizens permitted to enter the United States, the more manageable
and secure is our immigration system. Nevertheless, a bill benefiting a defined and limited
group of needy refugees, who would otherwise qualify for entry to the United States but for
faulty cogs in the resettlement wheel, may garner enough support to overcome restrictionist
votes.
The W visa would contain an annual statutory limit. The limit would reflect the number of
refugees affected by the post-9/11 backlog since 2001, plus allocate an additional 10,000 spots.
That would place the annual limit at 60,000 for the next two years (reflecting the 50,000 refugee
shortfall in fiscal years 2002 and 2003) and 30,000 in the third year (reflecting the 20,000
refugee shortfall in fiscal year 2004). The numbers for subsequent years would depend on the
shortfalls for each prior fiscal year, but would never fall below 10,000. Such a provision would
ensure that allocated refugee numbers not go to waste as they have for the past three fiscal years.
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It may also preserve the viability of the bill in the face of restrictionist objections to increasing
the number of refugees admitted to the United States.
D. Fraud Prevention Measures
Fraud is a serious and ongoing concern within the refugee resettlement program. The
perception of resettlement officials is that many fraud-related abuses have occurred at various
stages of refugee processing, such as resettlement applicants fabricating claims rumored to
secure resettlement approval,192 aid workers extorting bribes and sexual favors in exchange for
benefits,193 and refugees claiming non-family members as relatives.194 The proposed visa
attempts to minimize the chances for fraud, both in establishing eligibility and claiming familybased derivative benefits.
1.

Prevention of Fraud by Principle Applicants

Eligibility for the W visa would be risk-based rather than strictly actual harm-based, thus
rendering it less susceptible to fraud. The proposed visa seeks to protect not only those women
and children who have already suffered age or gender-related violence, but also those who are at
risk for it. The reports of UNHCR, the Department of State, and humanitarian agencies around
the world agree that women and children refugees face a significantly increased risk of harm in
refugee camps.195 In the case of those applicants who are single female heads of households or
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abandoned children, their very inclusion in those categories renders them eligible for
consideration and thus unlikely to fabricate claims of past harm.
The drafters of the included a provision barring certain spouses and parents of WOA
beneficiaries from securing derivative benefits at any time in the future, presumably to prevent
applicants from falsely claiming that family members were deceased in order to secure
benefits.196 Such a provision would also be necessary to preserve the integrity of the W visa
system. The minor children197 of gender-based beneficiaries and the minor siblings of age-based
beneficiaries would qualify for a derivative W visa based on their family relationship to the
principle applicant. However, certain spouses and parents of W visa beneficiaries would be
permanently barred from receiving derivative immigration benefits through a W visa holder or a
person who obtains LPR or citizenship by virtue of a W visa.198
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2.

Prevention of Fraud by Applicants for Derivative Status

In the post-9/11 world, verification of identity and family relationship has become more
important that ever. The findings of alleged fraud and abuse within the P-3 family-based
resettlement category, at a time when U.S. national security was already a source of deepest
concern, led to lengthy delays in all categories of resettlement processing.199 In order to protect
particularly vulnerable refugees from further delays brought on by security concerns, it is
necessary that any new legislation pertaining to refugees incorporate measures ensuring the
integrity of family relationships.
One way to ensure that derivative beneficiaries of the W visa actually belong to the family of
the principle beneficiary is to conduct DNA tests as part of the prerequisites to attaining
permanent immigration status.200 Regulations implementing the W visa could direct that
principle and derivative beneficiaries submit to DNA tests, in addition to the security checks,
within the prescribed time period. The government may seek to negotiate a large-scale contract
with DNA test providers in order to reduce the prohibitive cost that they currently carry.201
The legislation and its regulations must also recognize the existence of non-blood family
relationships.202 Many refugee families informally adopt children who are non-immediate family
members and non-blood relations in the event of the death or disappearance of the children’s
caretakers.203 In order to ensure that such relationships are bona fide, the regulations may
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require that the relationship existed for a certain length of time, such as two years prior to the
application for the W visa, or, alternatively, from the time of the civil unrest began in the home
country in cases where applicants have not accumulated two years of residency in a refugee
camp.
IV.

Conclusion

This article has discussed the dire circumstances of two particularly vulnerable groups –
refugee women and refugee children – and discussed how a narrowly tailored non-immigrant
visa could be a viable and efficient solution for those of them in the gravest and most immediate
danger. This proposal is not intended as a panacea for the dire situation of the world’s refugees;
nor is it intended as a proposal for radically overhauling the refugee system. Rather, this Article
endeavors to put forth a new solution for a new era of refugee resettlement. In this new era, the
balance between security concerns and humanitarian concerns has shifted disproportionately to
the side of security. The W visa attempts to tilt the scales back towards humanitarianism, albeit
not to the pre-9/11 ratio.
Refugees of both sexes and all ages, internally displaced persons such as those in the
Darfur region of Sudan, and refugees who reside outside of refugee camps face enormous
hardship. It is beyond the capability of one country, however, to create durable solutions for
every victim of civil unrest. Concerted, coordinated worldwide efforts are necessary to achieve a
goal of such enormity.
Each country with the capability to resettle refugees is an important component of
worldwide refugee resettlement, and the United States is the world leader in this respect. Its
leadership and commitment to refugees, however, has suffered a setback, just as many aspects of
U.S. society suffered a setback after September 11. This Article suggests a mechanism for
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overcoming the setback and reasserting the United States’ unmatched commitment to providing
an opportunity for a new life to those refugees for whom no other durable solution exists.
Unaccompanied minors and families headed by single females, especially when
compared to adult male applicants for student, visitor, and other non-immigrant visas, present a
low security risk. Moreover, their need for humanitarian assistance is obvious: having fled
persecution in their home countries, they encountered marginalization, violence, hunger and
exploitation in their ostensible place of refuge. Providing them with expedited, priority
resettlement benefits through a special visa category thus affirms the United States’ commitment
to refugees and to a rational approach towards reconciling national security concerns with
humanitarian principles.

52

